Abstract
DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxi1.07
In Kripke-semantics for modal logic, the truth value of a sentence depends on the choice of a semantic index (e.g. world, time, or place). It means that application of such semantics to natural language analysis requires indication of an index relevant for semantic analysis. It is commonly accepted that the relevant index is initialized by the context of an utterance. The idea has been rejected by the semanticists investigating tempo-modal languages in the framework of indeterminism what generated the problem of initialization of the semantic index. I present the main argument of those semanticists and describe several responses to the initialization problem. I finally argue that under certain metaphysical and semantic assumptions, one can respond to the initialization failure in the classical way, even in indeterministic contexts.
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