Abstrakt
The aim of the paper is to distinguish two common notions of the expression “to see” – objective and subjective without attributing beliefs to the observer. Thus, the main aim can be characterized as extensional explication. This gives us the ability to describe visual perception without assuming anything about higher cognitive abilities of the agent. Subsequent addition of the notion of belief enables me to characterize more visual categories present in the literature of the subject.
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