Two Ways of Using Signs. A Logical Conception of Meaning as a Way of Using Expressions

Abstrakt

In the paper, I outline the general, logical conception of meaning which is based on understanding it as a creation determined trough the way of using linguistic expressions. The concept of meaning is based on ideas deriving from L. Wittgenstein (1953) and independently from K. Ajdukiewicz (1931, 1978), and it is connected with the so-called functional approach to analysis of natural language ? the notion introduced by Jerzy Pelc (1971, 1979). This is marked by taking into consideration the manner of use expressions. Following Pelc, we distinguish two understandings of this statement: in the first of them, the manner of use concerns only expression-tokens (material sings); in the other ? the manner of Use (usage) characterizes the meaning of expression-types (classes of expression-tokens). This manner is somehow built into the meaning. The relation of use, concerning all the relations of physical object-based reference of expression-tokens made by users of language, will be a primitive notion of the theory outlined here. The relation Use, usage, is, on the other hand, a relation defined by means of the relation of use and applied by users of language to expression-types. The meaning of the expression-type e is defined as the equivalence class of the relation possessing the same manner of Use (usage) of types determined by type e. It may intuitively be understood as a common property of all expression-types possessing the same manner of Use (usage) as the expression e. In accordance with the well-known differentiations: Sinn-Bedeutung of G. Frege and intension-extension of R. Carnap, the notion of denotation differs from that of meaning and, in the paper, is defined by means of the relation referring of expression-type to objects of reality described by the given language.