Keywords
folk psychology
anti-realism
dispositionalism
natural kinds
Abstract
DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxix1.12
Reply to commentators in Semiotic Studies special issue on Unreal Beliefs. I defend the position developed in this book, i.e., minimal non-realism, against various charges. First, I defend the way I reconstructed folk commitments to realism about beliefs. Second, I deal with the arbitrariness charge against my definition of belief realism. Third, I critically evaluate a counterproposal to my view, namely the idea that beliefs are socially constructed natural kinds. Then I deal with the challenges levelled against my arguments against realism about belief. Finally, I reconsider some of the consequences of minimal non-realism and consider potential alternatives to it.
References
1. Bantegnie, B. (2026). Dispositionalism and Realism. A Commentary on Krzysztof Posłajko’s Unreal Beliefs. An Anti-Realist Approach to the Metaphysics of Mind. Studia Semiotyczne, 39(1), 147–157.
2. Birman, R. (2024). The Adoption Problem and the Epistemology of Logic. Mind, 133(529), 37–60.
3. Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes. The Journal of Philosophy, 78(2), 67–90.
4. Curry, D. S. (2020). Interpretivism and Norms. Philosophical Studies, 177(4), 905–930.
5. Curry, D. S. (2026) Beliefs Are Real(ly for Social Animals). Studia Semiotyczne, 39(1), 113–130.
6. Demeter, T. (2009). Two Kinds of Mental Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 40(1), 59–71.
7. Dennett, D. C. (1989). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
8. Dennett, D. C. (1998). Two Contrasts: Folk Craft versus Folk Science and Belief versus Opinion. In D. Dennett (Ed.), Brainchildren (pp. 135–148). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
9. Dennett, D. C. (2023). The Problem With Counterfeit People. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2023/05/problem-counterfeit-people/674075/
10. Fodor, J. A. (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (Vol. 2). Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
11. Godfrey-Smith, P. (2005). Folk Psychology as a Model. Philosopher’s Imprint, 5(6).
12. Hattiangadi, A. (2006). Is Meaning Normative? Mind & Language, 21(2), 220–240.
13. Hensel, W. (2026). Troubles With the Natural-Kind Approach to the Debate Over the Reality of Belief. Studia Semiotyczne, 39(1), 29–47.
14. Horowitz, A. (2024). Intentionality Deconstructed: An Anti-Realist Theory. Oxford University Press.
15. Horowitz, A. (2026) Posłajko on Belief Similarities and Belief Causation. Studia Semiotyczne, 39(1), 49–66.
16. Kalis, A. (2026). The Folk Are Doing Fine (But the Philosophers Are in Trouble). Studia Semiotyczne, 39(1), 89–100.
17. Komorowska-Mach, J. (2026). Rethinking Folk Realism About Beliefs. Studia Semiotyczne, 39(1), 101–111.
18. Kozak, P. (2026). Why Should We Be Realists About Beliefs? The Rational Indispensability Argument for Realism. Studia Semiotyczne, 39(1), 67–88.
19. Kripke, S. A. (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition. Harvard University Press.
20. Lewis, D. (1983). New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61(4), 343–377.
21. Loar, B. (1988). Social Content and Psychological Content. In R. H. Grimm, D. D. Merrill (Eds.), Contents of Thoughts (pp. 99–110). Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
22. Mölder, B. (2010). Mind Ascribed. An Elaboration and Defence of Interpretivism. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
23. Mölder, B. (2026). Belief: Minimal Non-Realism and the Constitutive Role of Interpretation. Studia Semiotyczne, 39(1), 131–146.
24. Neufeld, E. (2022). Psychological Essentialism and the Structure of Concepts. Philosophy Compass, 17(5). https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12823
25. Posłajko, K. (2020). Can Deflationism Save Interpretivism? Philosophia, 48(2), 709–725.
26. Posłajko, K. (2022). The Lycan-Stich Argument and the Plasticity of “Belief”. Erkenntnis, 87(3), 1257–1273.
27. Posłajko, K. (2024). Unreal Beliefs: An Anti-Realist Approach in the Metaphysics of Mind. Bloomsbury Publishing.
28. Ryle, G. (2009). The Concept of Mind. New York: Routledge.
29. Schwitzgebel, E. (2025, March 06). Kings, Wizards, and Illusionism about Consciousness. The Splintered Mind. https://eschwitz.substack.com/p/kings-wizards-and-illusionism-about
30. Schwitzgebel, E. (2026). Superficialism About Belief, and How We Will Decide that Robots “Believe”. Studia Semiotyczne, 39(1), 159–171.
31. Thomasson, A. L. (2015). Ontology Made Easy. Oxford: OUP.
32. Wright, C. (1993). Realism, Meaning, and Truth. Blackwell.
33. Zawidzki, T. (2026). Locating Belief on the Spectrum of Existence. Studia Semio¬tyczne, 39(1), 15–27.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 2026 Krzysztof Posłajko