Keywords
eliminativism
beliefs
mental causation
Abstract
DOI: https://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxix1.10
In this commentary, I invite Krzysztof to adopt a dispositionalist analysis of the belief concept and to draw the distinction between what is real and what is not in a way that does not beg the question against dispositionalism. Because his arguments against the dispositionalist analysis of the belief concept fall short, he certainly could do so.
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