Keywords
minimal non-realism
anti-realism
interpretivism
causation
constitution
folk psychology
Abstract
DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxix1.09
Posłajko’s minimal non-realism about belief combines a deflationary account of belief’s existence, a denial that beliefs are natural properties, and a revisionary stance toward the current folk concept of belief. This paper argues that rejecting or revising the folk concept is not necessary for anti-realism and develops a framework that allows for a more nuanced articulation of realist and anti-realist options about belief. The second half of the paper defends interpretivism, another deflationary position alongside minimal non-realism. In particular, it clarifies the constitutive role of interpretation in what it takes to have mental states, and the relationship between canonical ascribability and the possession of mental properties.
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