Counterfactuals and a Fiction Operator



The subject of the article is the relationship between counterfactuals and sentences containing the fictional operator. The aim is to show that this relationship provides good reasons for criticizing the so-called orthodox approach on counterfactuals. This approach has it that every counterfactual of the impossible antecedent is vacuously true. The criticism indirectly supports an alternative position that argues in favor of the falseness of some counterpossibles. Part of the text focuses on possible counterarguments of the orthodox approach.

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