Announcements
Current CFPs
CFP: NONSENSE IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT
What are the sources of nonsense? Are some parts of philosophical and non-philosophical discourse nonsense? What is the relation between nonsense and figurative speech? Is it at all possible to be wrong whether our own thoughts are meaningful? We hope that the special issue of Studia Semiotyczne will further strengthen and deepen the scholarly interest in nonsense.
Deadline for submissions: the 31st of July 2026
Details: http://studiasemiotyczne.pts.edu.pl/index.php/Studiasemiotyczne/nonsense
CFP: TRANSLATION—SEMIOTICS—MUSIC
The field of translation and music has been attracting increased attention recently: this is evident in numerous monographs, research papers, and conferences focused on the complex relationship between words and sounds. Against this backdrop, we would like to bring the two fields together through semiotics-based research on musical texts, believing that this perspective has the potential to create resonance for general translation studies.
Deadline for submissions:
the 30th of September 2026
Details: https://studiasemiotyczne.pts.edu.pl/index.php/Studiasemiotyczne/announcement/view/8
Current Issue
Recent years have brought a revival of the debate on the ontological status of beliefs. The debate was originally shaped in the 1980s by a controversy between representationism, most notably Fodor’s psychofunctionalism (1987), on the one hand, and eliminativism, which treated belief as a relic of an outdated theory of mind to be replaced by a mature cognitive science free of the propositional attitudes vocabulary, on the other (Churchland, 1981; Stich 1983). Nowadays, hardly anyone is willing to defend this radical form of antirealism about belief, chiefly due to the apparent indispensability of the central concepts of folk psychology both in everyday social cognition and in the sciences of the mind. For this reason, scepticism toward robustly realist views on belief tends to take one of two main forms: either mental fictionalism (Demeter, 2022; Parent, 2013; Toon, 2023), which treats talk about belief as a useful fiction, or superficialism (Curry, 2021; Mölder, 2010; Schwitzgebel, 2026), which accepts belief’s existence but denies its status as a deep, scientifically respectable component of our mental architecture [...].