Kantian Pragmatism and the Habermasian Anti-Deflationist Account of Truth
Tom 34 Nr 2 (2020), Rozprawy
Tom 34 Nr 2 (2020)

Kantian Pragmatism and the Habermasian Anti-Deflationist Account of Truth

Rozprawy
Opublikowano grudnia 3, 2020
Tomoo Ueda
Hosei University, Faculty of Law
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8493-5636

Abstrakt

DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxiv2.07

In this paper, I aim to characterize the pragmatist and anti-deflationist notions of truth. I take Habermas’s rather recent discussion (1999) and present the interpretation that his notion of truth relies on the reliabilist conception of knowledge rather than the internalist conception that defines knowledge as a justified true belief. Then, I show that my interpretation is consistent with Habermas’s project of weak naturalism. Finally, I draw some more general implications about the pragmatist notion of truth.

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