Self-locating beliefs are problematic for the popular theory according to which a belief is a two-argument relation between a thinker and a proposition. The theory does not explain the cognitive value of self-locating beliefs and their impact on behavior. Self-locating beliefs seem to be irreducible to singular beliefs about oneself, because one might have the latter without having the former. David Lewis, John Perry, and Robert Stalnaker each proposed a different solution to the problem. Stalnaker – unlike Perry and Lewis – defends the traditional theory of beliefs. His solution requires an assumption that a lack of self-locating belief can always be represented as ignorance with regard to which world is the actual one. I discuss Clas Weber’s arguments against this solution.
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Stalnaker (2011) przedstawia trzy argumenty przeciwko możliwości wewnątrzświatowej niewiedzy.
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Weber, Clas (2015), Indexical Beliefs and Communication: Against Stalnaker on Self-Location, „Philosophy and Phenomenological Research” 90(3), s. 640–663.