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axiomatic truth theories
Peano Arithmetic
Tarski boundary



This paper is an exposition of some recent results concerning various notions of strength and weakness of the concept of truth, both published and not. We try to systematically present these notions and their relationship to the current research on truth. We discuss the concept of Tarski’s boundary between weak and strong theories of truth and we give an overview of nonconservativity results for the extensions of the basic compositional truth theory. Additionally, we present a natural strong theory of truth, which admits a number of apparently unrelated axiomatisations. Finally, we discuss other possible explications for the notion of ‘strength’ in axiomatic theories of truth.

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