Abstract
DOI: https://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxv2.01
If you are reading this, there is a good chance that you are interested in conditionals. Also, depending on how deep your interest is, you may recognize the first sentence of this paragraph as an example of a conditional statement. If you did not recognize this, you should know that conditionals are complex expressions of the form “If A, then C” (formally, “A > C”). We often use them to indicate a connection between two states of affairs, expressed by the antecedent A (or if-clause) and a consequent C (or then-clause). For example: “If you ever lose your credit card, immediately inform your bank”, “If there is an action, there is an equal and opposite reaction”, “If the river were to rise another two feet, the subway system would be flooded”. By asserting statements like these, one usually suggests a relationship between two states, such that one affects the other. In other words, the second somehow obtains under the condition of the first [...].
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