The main aim of our paper was to present three formal tools for comparing various axiomatic theories of truth. In Section 2 we aimed at showing that there are indeed many different approaches to defining a set of axioms for the notion of truth. In Section 3 we introduced three different \measures of strength" of axiomatic theories of truth, i.e. three reflexive and transitive relations (preorders) on the set of axiomatic theories of truth. We have explained the intuition behind each of them. The three relations were called (from the most fine-grained to the coarsest): Fujimoto definability, model-theoretical strength, proof-theoretical strength. Then in the last section we described how they order the truth theories introduced in Section 2. We observed that theories made equivalent by the coarser relation can be strictly ordered by the next one.
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