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AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL WAY OF EXEMPLIFYING ARTISTIC REALITIES: FROM A “TRANSFORMATIONAL” TO A “TRANSCENDENTAL” SIGN

SUMMARY: The present paper shall principally consider two essential theoretical paradigms in semiotics. The first belongs to the post-structural paradigm designated by Greimas and Fontanille, whereas the second belongs to a recent paradigm named existential semiotics, authored by Tarasti. This text shall, therefore, explore how “artistic realities” are created through two semiotic methods: structural and existential semiotics. Theoretically speaking, there is a necessity to demonstrate how “semiotics of passions” enhanced such reality on the one hand and how existential semiotics asserted the notion of “action” and “performativity” through transcending signs on the other. I will focus on determined “classical” works of art (e.g., the position of figures, the text’s semiotic comprehension, etc.) to demonstrate the epistemological background of the artistic being (through their pre-, act, and post-signs). Semioticizing an artistic object of analysis (as known in existential semiotics through the *Dasein*), in my opinion, can enhance either inducing or deducing meaning. Such a sort of semioticizing exposes us to various sorts of “existential statuses” of discussable “semiotic objects” (in our case, artworks). By exemplifying fictive characters in the arts in general, I aim to reach a specific meaning of each of them: a fact that theoretically justifies an epistemology of semiotics.

KEY WORDS: semiotics, epistemology, signs, transformation, transcendence.

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1. Introduction

The present paper shall principally consider two essential theoretical paradigms in semiotics. The first one belongs to the post-structural paradigm as designated by Greimas and Fontanille (1993), whereas the second one belongs to a recent paradigm named existential semiotics, authored by Tarasti (2000). Each method or approach utilized should naturally be scientifically justified. The aim is to prove the object of analysis regarding the discussion to be presented later in this text. This part of the text shall principally focus on the methodological issue, after which a practical analysis of discussable matters shall be presented.

This paper attempts to respond to the following questions: how will such theoretical paradigms apply to artistic expressions? Is this only a theoretical discussion, or can such an issue be exemplified through concrete artworks? If one attempts to respond to the above questions, it is to conclude that “semiotic relations” shall be our object of analysis. In other words, actions, gestures, and mimics that enhance an artwork’s movement shall be named “semiotic objects”, in our instance. We ask: why do we have to assert such entities? Because of the multiple ways of interpreting the components that build up an artwork. It means that semiotics is a science capable of interpreting a chosen object of analysis, besides its other related possibilities.

I am to say that there is a plurality of semiotic approaches that are sufficient for disclosing a “semiotic reality” that an artwork otherwise contains. One should, however, consider the fact that more than one “semiotic reality” can be displayed (or even “created” by determined semiotic tools) in one single artwork. This text shall attempt to describe the semiotic circumstances that give rise to a “semiotic reality” regarding various forms of artistic expressivity through the recent semiotic paradigms mentioned above. The concept naturally deserves emphasis because each “semiotic reality” differs from one another in the same way as it differs from “lived” reality. This presupposition, naturally, is not novel in semiotics. Although the present text does not aim for a historical overview of the development of the semiotic method, it should be noted that the term stems from the Middle Ages and even earlier, as has been asserted by scholars (e.g., Deely, 2001). I aim to assert the hypothesis that the term cannot be defined one-dimensionally. In other words, it is necessary to use more than one theoretical paradigm to enhance a “semiotic reality” that can be caused (or be conditioned) by a chosen artwork.

Specifically speaking, I have chosen two different methodological approaches because of the facts mentioned above, among other related points, which will be presented later in this text. Let us now elucidate some other relevant matters that hopefully clarify our research method.

2. Structural Semiotics and Artistic Expressions

The subtitle above does not necessarily indicate a generalization. In other words, the aim here is not an attempt to create a theory that would enable “linking” the two notions methodologically. On the contrary, it will explore how structural semiotics can enhance various semiotic relations among artworks. In other words, the “intrusion” of semiotics in the context of this text would mean a methodology, or better expressed, an “intersemiotic sort of translation” (among other related issues, see Petrilli, Ji, 2022) of a given artistic text into a semiotic tool aimed at enhancing meaning.

The dyadic and systemic analysis of chosen “semiotic objects”, otherwise characteristic of the structural and post-structural eras within semiotic studies, enabled opposing relations and protagonists’ statuses within artworks and similar phenomena that either belonged to an everyday sort of living or to the human imaginative power and ability to create artworks. Therefore, it should be understandable why semiotics necessitates such “conflictual situations”, which are designated to obtain meaning or interpret diverse “meanings” as empirical results.

Structuralism, however, opposed determined tiny elements (depending on determined objects of analysis) to construct a structure, a structure that would further oppose another one: the aim was to create a system named a “semiotic system” in semiotics (Saussure, 1959), which would, by semiotics’ further developmental stages, prove the chain of trajectories of such systems which generate meaning (among other related issues, see Greimas, 1973). At this point, a new method of “generating” meaning, as Greimas proposes, has been introduced. It meant, and still means, naturally, that not only uniting form and content (or “discourse” and “story”, for instance, within arts; e.g., Chatman, 1978) would represent a process, a semiotic process, but such trajectories would intend obtaining “sems” (as their tinniest components; Greimas, 1973) that would result in meaningful semantic units. For this reason (and for other matters still to be mentioned in this text), Greimas’s generative semiotics marked a revolutionary shift in semiotics (especially, as we attempt to show, regarding the action of signs). The above assertion, however, is also due to the “active” Subject’s participation in the semiotic process, among other relevant matters. The term “semiotic process” is very relevant in our instance, as we consider semiotics to be about processes, in other words, processing signs. Above all, the aim is to obtain, create, manage, and interpret meaning, among other related matters. After all, as I have also observed elsewhere (Hoxha, 2022), Greimas manages to overcome the “binary” way of opposing “semiotic objects” (as he names them himself; Greimas, 1973). In other words, overcoming this phenomenon has opened doors to the hypothesizing status of determined “scientific objects” under analysis.¹ Such hypothesiz-

¹ One should intend this as a “pure” semiotic phenomenon in our instance. Otherwise, as generally known, the “epistemic way”, or the philosophic thought of “seeking knowledge”, has long ago been evident within philosophy as a science (Deely, 2001).

ing is part of an epistemic understanding of semiotics, as opposed to an ontological one. It is so, among other related reasons principally belonging to philosophy, because of the avoidance of “precision” in determined semiotic processes (as I have emphasized elsewhere; Hoxha, 2016). As I hope to be able to show further in the text, it also concurs with Eco’s “unequivocal” transmission of information (in Eco’s sense; e.g., Eco, 1968), which, through determined processes, “transform” themselves into signs (Eco, 1976).

Therefore, artworks represent a typical case of such “imprecision”. The semiotic statuses of the artworks are thus evident and analysable. Thus, theoretically, this paper attempts to disclose, present, and elaborate on semiotic situations that can practically demonstrate the above assertion. The above assertion, as I hope to be able to show later in the text, concurs with Tarasti’s existential semiotics as well (Tarasti, 2000; 2015).

Notwithstanding the above facts, however, the critical phenomenon of the sign definition in semiotics (either according to Saussure or other masters of semiotics that contributed to the above phenomenon; Deely, 2009; Peirce, 1960) was the sign’s form, its changeability and relatedness in different given circumstances, and its capacity to unite chosen components that, all together, would enhance meaning, as a result of each semiosis. A question, however, can be advanced: why do we emphasize the meaning component and the “sign” as an essential component in semiotics in the context of the present paper? One must admit that there is more than one reason for this assertion.

First, “meaning” as a semiotic entity in the arts is not always regarded as straightforward. It is so, as it may frequently be encoded or, as Eco says, over-coded (Eco, 1976). In other words, it means that the decoding process, metaphorically expressed as “resolving the enigma”, is complex and requires a process. Such processes must obtain determined shapes, including signs in their permanent movement. We call them “semiotic processes”, which usually interpret signs’ actions. If this thesis holds, then one concludes that it is semiotics that semiotizes artworks (or their purposely chosen elements) on the one hand, and on the other, one concludes that “interpretation” is a crucial term of semiotic analysis in our instance. In such a case, it is logical to conclude that one treats the processing of the signs within artworks and their finalized statuses, considered through the notions of “transformation” and “transcendence”, as I shall attempt to show,² among other related theoretical paradigms, as belonging to the semiotic method.

Second, if the above thesis does not prove true, how would one process other connotational meanings of an artwork, its protagonists, or relational attitudes besides their denotational ones? In the following lines of the present text, let us

² Understandably, the terms in question do not belong only to semiotics. They are above all, an integral part of linguistics and philosophy, as I shall try to show later in the present text.

see how such “semiotic situations” are finalized to obtain their empirical results in concrete works of art.

2.1. A Methodological “Intervention” Through Examples

Authors usually use their experience as a starting point to create art. It naturally, as is generally known, differs from other sorts of “texts”, either understood in the semiotic sense of the word or not. Such an experience, however, may sometimes contain elements that belong to human imaginative power. It means, in other words, that the term “experience” here should not be comprehended only within its philosophical understanding (in the sense that determined philosophical, scientific postulates have historically developed it regarding the semiotic method); it should, rather, be intended in its psychological sense as well, to refer to textual analysis, among other related matters.

Notwithstanding the facts, I aim to say that the mentioned “conflictual situation” is created by writing, performing, and preparing for an artistic work. Such a situation, intriguingly enough, is semiotic and has a semiotic nature (either in its general or specific terms). The reasons for this assertion are the following: no text in the shape initially created by the author is finalized as an artwork. As I attempt to show, it needs processing, as artworks are complex phenomena. More “actors” are indispensable in accomplishing the goal in its final form and content. Hence, such texts are objects for a process of “transformation” or reshaping them, aiming to render them artistic.

Moreover, besides various narration procedures, artworks (theatre, opera, ballet, musical performances, etc.) contain an “action” component. It is at this point that, besides an essential semiotic function (which, as we may suggest, is obvious; Eco, 1976; Saussure, 1959), a “complex semiotic function” (such as in Greimas, Fontanille, 1993; Tarasti, 2015) is necessary. It is intended to overcode the message and its movement and changeability in various shapes in the first place and to interpret it based on determined theoretical models in the second, which would supposedly generate, extract, or deduce its proper meaning.

As should be evident by now, “complex semiotic function” can represent something that cannot immediately be decoded, visualized, or decomposed—besides what is visible, understandable, and decodable to the receiver of the message (if one wants to understand phenomena communicationally). One needs processing to resolve such phenomena: in our case, signs’ changeability and their statuses in different stages and given circumstances.

Let us explain this situation. Signs representing a matter of contradictoriness, for instance, among one another and other relations, may sometimes be challenging to decode because of their “transformational” status in different stages of their transformable trajectories. The gradualness of the solution aimed at a final meaning means decoding the message (artistic or of another nature). Based on generating meaning, such theories were explicitly created by Greimas and Fontanille (1993) and, later, innovatively enough, by Tarasti (2000) because of the

explicable transcendent nature of signs. Let us see why these two paradigms and their differences are emphasized here.

First, the “action” component, primarily in performing arts (but in other discussable matters as well), does not mean only “the white” against the “black”, as early structuralism used to presuppose. On the contrary, besides the apparent oppositional relations to be “captured” by semioticians, we ask: why is a determined action performed to have inevitable consequences in the work? Such consequences, no doubt, are more than one; therefore, one speaks here of a specter of meaning(s) belonging to a determined entity under discussion. Moreover, is there not any other way to finalize the work? In my opinion, generative and existential semiotics can respond to such questions and other possibilities that modern semiotics can offer, such as those found in the post-structural development period.

Second, the narration process itself is not as simple as it might initially seem. Let me explain: the interruption of a particular event by another (which may not immediately be visible to the audience) has a strong relevance in semiotics. It is there that Greimas’s “modalities” and Tarasti’s “meta-modalities” can find their places, precisely because of their multifarious interpretations.

Let us now advance some practical questions: was the love between Ophelia and Hamlet “real”, for instance, and why? A “model reader” (Eco, 1984) would understand, for instance, how “formal” their love is and what contextual circumstances led to it.

Another question: did Hamlet’s father appear on the scene only because of Hamlet’s complexities in his psychological status, or was it a reminiscence of certain events in the “story narrated” by Shakespeare? Here, the answer must not be ambiguous: the appearance of his father (“the Ghost”), as described in the play, is part of Hamlet’s long-term memory; therefore, it represents his will to take revenge on determined occurrences in the “story narrated”. The aim, naturally, based on semiotic terms, is rendering “passions”, such as “greed”, and a wish, or after all, a desire to have the authority and political power his father had.

Let us go further with some other questions regarding Shakespearean tragedies. Was Othello in a relationship of contradiction with Iago only because of jealousy or other relevant matters? Who “intruded” on their similarly “good” relationship, initially presented in the exposition stage of the play? Naturally, the complex “feeling”, if one wishes to name it so, of “jealousy”, transforms itself into passion through Cassio’s helping the drama’s intrigue come about. The examples above are intended to disclose the structural method of disclosing human characters in diverse artworks.

Let us sum up this part of our discussion. “Passional configurations”, for instance, as finalized meaningful units (Greimas, Fontanille, 1993), could extract or generate such passions as “love” as opposed to “hatred”, “jealousy”, and “greed”, etc., in certain characters. In this sense of the word, based on the “chain” of either the author’s combination of form and content or the audience’s imaginative suppositions (as Eco, for instance, explains; Eco, 1994), one can

hypothesize certain conclusions. Since each artwork can be interpreted differently (or, as each sort of “interpretation” has its semiotic relevance), as Eco says, it is “open” to reach such a goal (Eco, 1989). It means that each hypothesis can find a justification, or better expressed, a “truth” of its own. Finally, if there is more than one “truth” (among other related authors, see Goldman, 1986), then each hypothesis is scientifically justified. Epistemologically speaking, then, our thesis becomes justified. It thus makes semiotics a science for seeking knowledge, as has also been noted (by scholars). Before I elaborate on further examples regarding the issue under discussion, I consider it proper to present the main concepts and hypotheses of existential semiotics.

3. Existential Semiotics and the Artworks

This part of the text will attempt to disclose some of the main principles of “existential semiotics”: a theory launched by Tarasti (2000). Based principally on post-Hegelian philosophy, existential semiotics prioritizes the Being and the Subject. The novelty in this highly applicable theory in the arts is the term “transcendence”, based on the permanent movement and changeability of signs. Instead of the “transformability” of signs (in Greimas’s sense) and the trajectory of their transformation in sequence, the signs are transcendent in existential semiotics. This phenomenon is due, at least, to two components: the Subject’s existence and its being prioritized on the one hand, and on the other, another communication model that differs from the “classic ones”. The semiotic process, as shall be seen, is “intermediated” by the *Dasein*, and it is foreseen, if one may use such a term, in some “stages”. Let us describe these “existential situations” subsequently.

Instead of the classical flow of the message, from the source to the receiver (Eco, 1968; 1976; Shannon, Weaver, 1948), the signs (which, if combined, make up the message) do not instantly reach the destination. Their “trip” is somewhat double-sided, intermediated by the *Dasein*. In other words, there may be changes during the “trip”; since the signs are transcendent. The truth is that such a “trip” runs through some stages: the “pre-signs”, “act-signs”, and “post-signs” (Tarasti, 2000). To my understanding, the matter relies on two components, at least: the cognitive and perceptive. Let me try to explain this situation.

“Perceptive” is used because prior to each process of semiosis, one has to “find out”, see, and analyze the components under discussion. The key here is a “preparatory stage” before each semiotic process occurs. It concurs with the “pre-signs”, which, in existential semiotics, activate the signs to initiate the process for the forthcoming stages, as I named them.

“Cognitive”, however, because each such component must obtain its functionality. The “functionality”, however, put in simple terms, means cognition of the phenomena discussed. This notion, however, concurs with the “act-signs”, which show the beginning of the signification process itself. Both processes, as known in semiotics, do not suffice as such. They need to be interpret-

ed. The semiotic process, therefore, is finalized by the “post-signs”, which interpret the “semiotic object” under discussion. In support of this assertion, let us quote Tarasti:

A semiotic act occurs as the production of an act-sign by means of the help of a pre-sign or enunciant/utterant; or the act takes place as the interpretation of the act-sign by means of the help of the post-sign or interpretant [...]. (Tarasti, 2000, p. 33)

The “interpretation” mentioned above is also empirically visible through existential semiotics’ models (in our instance, through the graphical representation): the “Z” or Zemic model. This paper shall not extend to an in-depth analysis of the mentioned artworks, as our attempt is theoretical and methodological. Our goal is to demonstrate the epistemological background of both paradigms on the one hand and discuss their mutual inclusiveness and exclusiveness on the other.

Otherwise, the act of “interpretation” is, of course, not novel in semiotics: it is a matter that seeks the final meaning, the presupposed final meaning of chosen semiotic objects, even in earlier stages of semiotics, named “classical semiotics” by Tarasti (2000). A logical question, then, follows: why? Interpretation is as old as the communication process itself, and it confirms the philosophical paradigms and provenance of semiotic theory, even from the Middle Ages (Eco, 1976; 1997). Notwithstanding the above facts, one must admit that these assertions are not the only ones that create, I would dare say, what one calls “existential semiotics” today. One must provide examples of concrete artworks to elaborate on other related matters regarding existential semiotics.

For instance, one must admit that Othello immediately refuses Iago’s “false argument”: the handkerchief. He becomes furious in that instance of the play and, as Tarasti says, “negates” it. Two essential components, at least, in my view, can be noted here: first, the notion of “becoming” (known to semioticians from Greimas’s theory), and second, the refusal negation, after which an “affirmation” is about to follow. What differentiates this theory from the “semiotics of passions” is the following: instead of the act of finalizing semantic units into meaningful ones, named “passions” (Greimas, Fontanille, 1993), in Tarasti’s theory, the signs are “intermediated” by the *Dasein*. This is because of another kind of communication between the parties concerned, as we explained above. Moreover, signs’ “moveability” means that they are reshaped or interpreted in various stages. In other words, not only are “seeming” and “reality” strongly differentiated in this case (as Greimasian semiotics has attempted to show), but they are even “flowing”, if I may use this term, thus being ready for another process of interpretation (if one wants, inspired by existential philosophy). It is for this reason, if one wants, inspired by Hegelian philosophy (“being-in-itself” and “being-for-itself”), that both “negation” and “affirmation” contribute to the final process of signification. Moreover, the above thesis also discloses that “the

semiosis unfolds according to a certain logic, in which ‘being’ creates a ‘non-being’ that is dissolved into subsequent ‘being’” (Tarasti, 2000, p. 33).

If matters are understood in the mentioned fashion, signs appear to be transcendental, because they have been transformed into a brand new shape. What one finds instead is the hypothesizing “space” that Tarasti’s theory offers to the semiotician. In other words, if the process stops at a certain point, it does not mean “noise” in the communication channel, but, on the contrary, a chance to semiotize the sign through the *Dasein* and the transcending notion. Besides, the subject “activates” the process instead of a given “semiotic object”, as Greimas would say, on the one hand, but on the other, as Tarasti says, one does not know the “receiver” if one understands matters communicationaly. Let us continue with our example now.

After a determined stage of the play, Othello “accepts” or “affirms” the handkerchief as “proof” for the tragedy to happen later in the “story narrated”. In another context, the “pre-signs”, in our case, the “seemingly” good relationships between Othello and Iago, create a “semiotic reality”. We shall call it animosity between them, which creates “jealousy” (primarily regarded as a “passion” in terms of Greimas’s and Fontanille’s theory). The Being of Othello, therefore, intermediated by the *Dasein*, obtains a new shape: desperation, his furiousness because of jealousy, and his earlier belief in a glorious and victorious warrior. This “affirmation” concurs with the “act-signs”: a semiotic process has occurred. Victimizing Desdemona (through Cassio, as is known, an intrigue initiated by Iago) is a consequence; therefore, it interprets the phenomenon. It represents the “post-signs” in our case.

In contrast to the “classical” semiotic paradigms, as I have attempted to show, one learns that one’s existence is threatened if one can use this word in its metaphorical sense. Practically, in our instancing of Shakespeare, it means that Othello’s existence is threatened, a fact which can be noted in Act IV of the play (Shakespeare, 2002). “Existence” in Tarasti’s theory means “being there” (Tarasti, 2015). Finally, do we not see the main protagonists’ existence in each kind of artistic expressivity to the end of the “story narrated”? However, there is a difference in their behavior, displayed by the actors on the one hand and by the audience on the other. In conclusion, the problem is both communicational and semiotic.

3.1. “Transformational” or “Transcending” Signs?

The examples shown above represent an attempt to explicate how a determined artwork becomes semiotized. In this sense of the word, one must emphasize which theory, or paradigm, is followed by another. In my opinion, it asserts a method that prioritizes an epistemic view of semiotic analysis in the first place, and in the second, it represents a method that prioritizes the Subject instead of the Object. The aim of this part of the text, therefore, is methodological: it at-

tempts to demonstrate the differences and similarities between the two paradigms presented above. Let us attempt to explain this situation.

Both theories use their model schemes, which represent applicable matters of whichever “semiotic object”. In other words, it means that the practical applicability of a determined research method enables reaching empirical results. This fact represents inclusiveness in both paradigms. However, in my view of this theoretical explication, two notions become noticeable: “transformation” and “transcendence”. Let us try to explain both terms.

As is known by now, “transformation” as a critical concept was initially used by Chomsky (2002). Chomsky used the term for other purposes, such as explaining generative grammar. It is used to attempt to create a universal grammar based on determined rules that would create a syntactically sound sentence. Greimas, on the other hand, found the use of such a concept to explain the chain of generating meaning. The method, therefore, found new scientific contexts that attempted to cover other matters besides the already known linguistic ones, as advanced by Chomsky. Naturally, all of that contributed to semiotics, as “transformability” not only referred to the changeability of signs but also to finalizing semantic units through the “semiotic square” (Greimas, 1973). Either used “schematically” or, if one wants, by “mathematical equations”, Greimas achieved his goal of seeking the meaning of each chosen “semiotic object”. Moreover, calling it “a semiotics of action” (Greimas, Fontanille, 1993), the theory obtained full epistemic status, and the meaning units obtained were empirically and practically explainable to the academic audience. Among other related matters, this is apparently due to the modalities of Being and Doing, which could be foreseen even in Greimas’s earlier theoretical production, which, as we mentioned, have created the “semiotic square”.

“Transcendence”, on the other hand, is one of the crucial concepts in Tarasti’s theory, and it marks precisely movement and changeability aimed at obtaining meaning. Thus, the “semiotic object’s” Being can only be concretized into a concrete, meaningful unit. Except for the philosophical understanding, which is more than evident in existential semiotics, the inter-relationships among the entities concerned have a strong relevance. This can be proven by the fact that a ‘dual’ or “systemic” view of phenomena would not suffice for obtaining a single meaningful unit, but, instead, a plurality of meaningful units. For this reason, I contend that existential semiotics further “develops”, interprets, and semioticizes the earlier established “passional configurations”. In other words, Tarasti’s theory further elaborates on “meta-modalities” and multiple possible receivers of the message, or introduces the researcher to more than one semiotic level (or even solution). Finally, the “Subject’s” notion and the process’s representability through the Zemic or Z model demonstrate such a theory’s applicability in precise, meaningful units.

4. Conclusion

The present paper's objective was, as I hope to have been able to show, to attempt to enhance the semiotic process through two recent paradigms. The reason that inspired me to offer this contribution to the academic audience is precisely the essential "shift" of semiotic studies, ranging from the object notion (based mainly on ontology) to the subject notion (grounded mainly in epistemology). Both concepts are semiotically relevant and prove their permanent changeability because they frame the attempt to induce or deduce meaning. Other representatives of "classical semiotics" can naturally prove the facts above. Be it for an essential "semiotic function" or a "complex one", the paradigms in question demonstrate a subsequent flow of the action of signs, or the "signs' way", as Deely (2001) expresses himself, regarding the modern and postmodern development of the semiotic method.

Tarasti's theory has brought distinguishability and in-depth study to these tiny elements, such as a musical work's analysis, relations with the composers or writers, and audience acceptance through semiotic and philosophical models. Let us only remind ourselves of various "authors' and composers'" "transformation" of one single artwork into diverse formats or shapes: if Shakespeare wrote *Romeo and Juliet*, Prokofiev "transformed" it into a ballet, intriguingly enough, through modern music belonging to the beginnings of the twentieth century. It thus represents a "re-semioticizing" of one artwork, thus enhancing a new "semiotic reality".

On the one hand, therefore, Tarasti's existential semiotics asserts the creators' capacities and subjects' pertinence and moveability into various discussable semiotic contexts, and on the other, it asserts the possibility of multiple empirical results. In other words, it means that more than one "meaningful unit" can be obtained through existential models, as well because of the meta-modalities, as explained in Tarasti's (2015).

The goal of the present text is hopefully known by now: the omnipresence of the semiotic method(s) in analyzing and levelling various "semiotic realities". A "semiotic reality", in the sense I have attempted to show above, differently interpreted by the researcher, critic, or audience (in the case of artistic expressivity), can also pertain to an epistemic status of each entity under discussion, precisely because its validity can be conceptualized in its various analytical levels. If all of them are correlated or related to each other, they represent a process of semiosis, either in Peircean terms or in general terms in semiotics.

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