From the Editor

MARIA MATUSZKIEWICZ *

INTRODUCTION

The six papers collected in this volume address a broad range of problems related to the theme of context and content. Among the topics discussed by the authors are the relation between mental and linguistic content, the role of context in the determination of the semantic values of demonstrative expressions, the foundational question about the nature of propositions and their role as objects of propositional attitudes, the temporal versus eternal nature of desire contents and challenges posed by attitudes *de se* to the traditional view of contents. Some of these papers were presented at the 3rd *Context, Cognition and Communication*, which took place in Warsaw in September 2022, and one paper was discussed in the workshop *Demonstratives and Indexicals III* dedicated to Una Stojnić's book *Context and Coherence* (2021). The workshop was organized in Warsaw in January 2023 as part of the project "Semantic and Epistemological Aspects of Ostension: From Demonstrating Procedures to the Exploitation of the Context of Utterance".

In "Demonstratives, Gesture and Logical Form", Geoff Georgi scrutinizes two theses of Una Stojnić's (2021) theory of demonstrative reference. Multi-Modality treats gestures as syntactic elements of demonstrative expressions, and Ambiguity claims that those syntactic elements are individuated by the objects of the demonstrative reference. The two theses are part of Stonić's solution to the problem of referential promiscuity: the fact that multiple occurrences of a demonstrative expression in one sentence contribute different propositional contents relative to the same context. Georgi discusses each of Stojnić's four arguments supporting Multi-Modality and Ambiguity, deeming them inconclu-

* University of Warsaw, Faculty of Philosophy. E-mail: maria.j.matuszkiewicz@gmail.com. ORCID: 0000-0001-5799-4972.

sive. In the last section of the paper, he focuses on the argument from different inferential schemes involving sentences with multiple occurrences of a demonstrative expression, offering an alternative solution that takes a coordination scheme to be part of the Kaplanian context. The alternative approach avoids the main drawback of Stojnić's theory—the massive ambiguity at the level of deictic gestures, which would make language learning implausibly difficult.

In "Twardowski on Content and Meaning", Marie Michon examines the relationship between the mental notion of *content* and the linguistic notion of *meaning* in the philosophy of Kazimierz Twardowski. After introducing Twardowski's conception of intentionality with its central distinction between the mental act's content and object, the author focuses on a less studied topic—the philosopher's conception of meaning. Michon emphasizes Twardowski's pragmatic approach to language with its central idea that speakers use language to convey meanings and thereby elicit mental presentations in their listeners. The resulting conception, the author argues, sees meanings as subjective and dynamic. Michon closes her paper with a discussion of similarities and differences between Twardowski's and Frege's theories of meaning.

In "The Act-Type Theory of Propositions as a Theory of Cognitive Distinctness", Thomas Hodgson examines Scott Soames' version of the act-type theory of propositions and the way it accounts for propositions' playing the role of objects of attitudes. To capture fine-grained differences between attitudes Soames distinguishes between representational and cognitive identity of propositions and between direct and mediate predication. Hodgson argues that Soames' theory of mediate predication fails its task and proposes an alternative solution that makes the required distinctions.

In "One Semantic Content, Belief Content and Belief Ascription", Juliana Lima proposes a novel solution to Frege's Puzzle on the basis of two ideas. First, she argues that semantic and cognitive contents are not identical: the Millian theory provides the former, and the Fregean theory provides the latter. Second, Lima articulates the view that takes truth values of belief sentences to be relativized to a point of evaluation. These points of evaluation consist of a narrative surrounding a belief ascription that specifies the cognitive content to be found in the subject's belief box.

In "Desire Contents and Temporal Adverbs", Daniel Skibra defends desire temporalism—the view that desire contents do not contain time indications—from the apparent counterexample of desire ascriptions containing temporal adverbs. To answer this objection the author interprets temporal adverbs as constraining the temporal parameter of the circumstance of evaluation rather than contributing a time indication to the propositional content. Skibra considers a way of implementing this idea on the basis of Brogaard's (2012) theory of composite time operators. However, he prefers a different approach which accommodates the proposed interpretation of temporal adverbs with the pronominal account of tenses

In "Saving the Traditional View of Contents From the Messy Shopper and His Crazy and Amnesiac Acolytes", Jakub Rudnicki addresses the challenge that attitudes *de se* present to the standard view of contents which sees them as absolute and accessible. The standard view has difficulty accounting for the role that attitudes *de se* play in explaining behavior. Rudnicki's Double Belief Theory offers a new solution for those who wish to save the standard view. The author analyzes beliefs *de se* as consisting of two beliefs, one of which is a second-order belief about the other. Rudnicki presents two versions of the theory that differ in whether the second-order belief concerns the content of the first belief or the act of believing it.

All the contributions collected in this volume highlight the central role that the notions of context and context continue to play in philosophical debates. Addressing a broad range of issues, proposing novel solutions, and engaging with some recent competing theories, these papers will—we hope—open new avenues of discussion.

REFERENCES

Brogaard, B. (2012). *Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions*. Oxford: OUP.

Stojnić, U. (2021). *Context and Coherence: The Logic and Grammar of Prominence*. Oxford: OUP.