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FROM THE ISSUE EDITOR

When J. L. Austin first presented his work on speech acts, it concentrated primarily on explaining how our utterances can change the non-linguistic reality around us. A new fruitful area of study explaining how saying something can constitute *doing something else than saying* was established, and for a very long time—in fact, until this day—philosophers debate what makes a promise a promise and not just a plan, what distinguishes an assertion from a conjecture, and what kind of mental states are required of a speaker for her illocution to be successful. The original framework, as presented by Austin's colleague, John Searle, has shaped a vast landscape of many very different research projects, such as explaining the normative structure underlying performing speech acts, exploring the connections between illocutions and other pragmatic phenomena such as implicature and presupposition, or investigating how speech acts influence the conversational scoreboard, to name just a few. Yet another area of research centres on applying speech act theoretic devices to tackle apparently distant problems in philosophy of language, such as reference, disagreement or lying.

In this issue, we present papers representing various applications of the speech act framework. Some of them tackle internal theory issues. Others show applications of the speech act theoretic tools to the phenomena pertaining to other areas of philosophy of language. Two papers are concerned with the foundational question of truth which, though to some extent orthogonal to the main topic, is in the background of all these investigations.

In the article opening this issue, **Grzegorz Gaszczyk** offers a comprehensive review of the normative accounts of speech acts. The normative approach, ac-

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cording to which speech acts are social practices regulated by norms and resulting in commitments, has been revived, most notably, by Williamson (2000), who defines the speech act type of assertion in terms of a constitutive norm:

Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA): "One must: assert *p* only if one knows *p*"

Since then, many normative accounts of assertion have been proposed varying as to what the norm should be (the belief norm [e.g., Hindriks, 2007], the truth norm [e.g., Weiner, 2005], the justification norm [e.g., Lackey, 2007], and others) and as to the status of the norm itself: what it means that the norm is constitutive, whether it plays the role of a necessary condition, whether it can be violated and the act would still count as an assertion, etc. Gaszczyk observes that since most research over the years has focused on assertion and because the KNA is often assumed, many authors treat other types of speech acts, in particular, various kinds of constatives, as governed by some version of the knowledge norm. As a result, a problem emerges, which he calls EXTENSION: "Various norms of assertion denote different clusters of illocutions as belonging to assertions"—in other words, some illocutions (e.g., predictions) will count as assertions according to some norm (e.g., truth) but not according to others (e.g., knowledge). With this in mind, the Author provides a review of accounts advocating various norms of speech act types other than assertion: i.a., telling, proffering, explanation or question-asking, as well as what he calls ancillary speech acts, such as presuppositions and implicatures.

Antonio Monaco takes up the practice of insinuating—communicating something implicitly rather than explicitly for reasons having to do with politeness, deniability or conversational strategy. For instance, in asking speaker *A*: "Do you not have any other dress outside this one?", speaker *B* insinuates that *A* always wears the same dress. Searle calls such speech acts indirect speech acts—an act performed via performance of another act (here it is asking a question). *Pace* authors such as Strawson (1964) or Bell (1997), Monaco argues that insinuations are a *sui generis* illocutionary act type and should not simply be reduced to indirect speech acts. Insinuations, according to him, do behave like indirect speech acts, except insinuations are always deniable. Consider the request to pass the salt—an indirect illocution—performed by means of asking a question: "Can you reach the salt?". The Author argues that the request is not an insinuation as the conventionally stereotyped phrasing does not allow the speaker to deny what was being suggested. On the other hand, one can always deny she was offering a bribe to a police officer when she said: "I am in a bit of a hurry. Is there any way we can settle this right now?". Mere deniability is not a sufficient condition for being an insinuation, however. What Monaco considers crucial is that the speaker have "the disposition to deny that she meant I [what is insinuated] in case a non-cooperative hearer argues the meaning of U [the utterance] is I". This condition is required because of the character of the conversa-

tional situations in which insinuation typically occurs—i.e., limited knowledge of the speaker regarding the intentions and values of the interlocutor.

In his paper, **Maciej Witek** offers an analysis of demonstrative reference in terms of speech act theory. The account is able to shed a new light on the familiar dilemma outlined by Kaplan (1979): while giving a talk facing his audience, the professor points at the wall behind him and utters: "That is a painting of the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century". The professor is sure he is pointing at a picture of Rudolf Carnap but unbeknownst to him, someone had replaced it with a picture of Spiro Agnew. According to some authors, it is the object intended and not the one pointed at which contributes to the referential content of the act. Witek proposes an analysis of demonstrative reference which makes use of the responsibilist approach to (speech) acts, whose consequence is the claim that inept or careless pointing has, under certain circumstances, illocutionary, rather than perlocutionary consequences, that is—it matters for determining demonstrative reference and affects conversational dynamics. The Author distinguishes two types of referential content—(1) what is determined by the speaker's directing intentions (*what is intended*), and (2) what the speaker can be held responsible for in the light of how the competent audience understands them. Witek dubs (2) *public content* and characterizes it as "sensitive to the hearer's uptake or, more specifically, to how competent interlocutors interpret the speaker's words and gestures". *What is intended* and *what is public* normally coincide but may come apart in some conversations, such as the Carnap-Agnew case or others proposed by, e.g., Korta and Perry (2011). The Author shows how his account helps explain not only such examples but also cases of unintended pointing.

In his paper (written in Polish), **Marek Nowak** presents a characterization of presuppositions in terms of speech act theory. First, he outlines the most important features of semantic presuppositions: their projective behaviour, their relation to logical truths, and what distinguishes them from logical entailments. Further, the Author proposes to treat presuppositions as preparatory conditions of the illocutionary force. Preparatory conditions (Searle, 1969) are the assumptions which have to obtain for a given type of illocution to be non-defective. For instance, one of the preparatory conditions for a promise is that the promised state of affairs would be beneficial for the hearer (if it was not, then what is intended as a promise might be a mere assertion or even a threat). Preparatory conditions constitute one of the parameters characterizing the illocutionary force for various types of speech acts. Nowak argues that either the truth of every propositional presupposition of a sentence or the interlocutor's supposition that all the propositional presuppositions of a given utterance are true can be interpreted as an appropriate preparatory condition for the illocutionary act the uttered sentence is used to perform. This claim goes against the order Vanderveken (1990) assumes in his view: according to him, the truth of the presupposition of a sentence is checked, and then its compliance with preparatory conditions might be analyzed. Here, the truth of what is presupposed is treated on par with the standard preparatory conditions.

Giulia Cirillo's paper concerns the action of translation as pivotal for two pragmatic accounts of truth—that of Charles Sanders Peirce and that of William James. She starts off by mentioning one of the most celebrated objections to pragmatism—i.e., that the pragmatic approach to the notion of truth irrevocably leads to anti-realism. According to its critics, truth understood as something dependent on the community and evolving is changeable, disprovable and, in effect, unreliable. To show how this objection might be countered, the Author invokes the notion of translation understood in the framework of Peirce's Scientific Method. She proposes to treat external reality, which provides sense perceptions, as the source text. Each perceiver then becomes a translator, forming beliefs subjectivised by their own interpretation of the reality. In confrontation with others, the perceiver needs to adjust their beliefs in recognition of the need to coordinate. Cirillo likens this process to translation since the perceptual language of the source text is translated into the intersubjective language shared by the scientific community. And just as in case of translation, there is no ultimate, perfect version of the target text even if the community agrees upon it—it may always undergo revision. These features, according to the Author, help pragmatism avoid the relativist objection—the changeable nature of truth should not be viewed as resulting in unreliability but in its inherent adjustability which strives to agreement with the rest of the scientific world.

The issue closes with the article by **Zbigniew Tworak** (in Polish), in which he discusses the theory of truth by Haim Gaifman. Gaifman's proposal is aimed at accounting for a version of the strong liar paradox. The standard antinomy is generated by uttering: "This sentence is false". The strengthened version can be phrased as follows:

(1) The sentence in line (1) is not true.

(2) The sentence in line (1) is not true.

The sentence in line (1) brings about the familiar problem, which is why it is not true. Therefore, the conclusion in (2) seems true, but it is the very same sentence as (1), so it must be just as problematic. This is the conclusion that any satisfactory theory of truth should let us avoid. According to Gaifman, it cannot be done if we take sentence-types to be the primary truth-bearers. Tworak lays out the details of Gaifman's proposal and further presents some critical remarks concerning it.

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