Semiotic Studies

From the Issue Editor

Natalia Karczewska — Sun, 07 May 2023 07:49:29 +0200

DOI: https://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxvi2.01

When J. L. Austin first presented his work on speech acts, it concentrated primarily on explaining how our utterances can change the non-linguistic reality around us. A new fruitful area of study explaining how saying something can constitute doing something else than saying was established, and for a very long time—in fact, until this day—philosophers debate what makes a promise a promise and not just a plan, what distinguishes an assertion from a conjecture, and what kind of mental states are required of a speaker for her illocution to be successful. The original framework, as presented by Austin’s colleague, John Searle, has shaped a vast landscape of many very different research projects, such as explaining the normative structure underlying performing speech acts, exploring the connections between illocutions and other pragmatic phenomena such as implicature and presupposition, or investigating how speech acts influence the conversational scoreboard, to name just a few. Yet another area of research centres on applying speech act theoretic devices to tackle apparently distant problems in philosophy of language, such as reference, disagreement or lying.

Norms of Speech Acts

Grzegorz Gaszczyk — Sun, 07 May 2023 07:50:05 +0200

DOI: https://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxvi2.02

This paper offers a systematic classification and characterization of speech acts and their norms. Recently, the normative approach has been applied to various speech acts, most notably to constatives. I start by showing how the work on the norms of assertion has influenced various approaches to the norms of other speech acts. I focus on the fact that various norms of assertion have different extensions, i.e., they denote different clusters of illocutions as belonging to an assertion. I argue that this has consequences for theorising about norms of other speech acts and generates certain arbitrary divisions. In the central part, I analyse two groups of speech acts. Firstly, ordinary speech acts, like predictions or retractions. Secondly, I indicate how the normative view can be extended to so-called ancillary speech acts, like presuppositions or implicatures. I end with a discussion of possible extensions of the normative approach, focusing on the debate on lying.

Insinuations, Indirect Speech Acts, and Deniability

Antonio Monaco — Sun, 07 May 2023 07:50:37 +0200

DOI: https://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxvi2.03

Insinuations are indirect speech acts done for various reasons: a speaker S may insinuate P (i) because an insinuation is more polite, and S can save face by non-explicitly saying P (Brown, Levinson, 1987; Searle, 1975), (ii) because S can deny having insinuated P and avoid the responsibility of explicitly stating P, or (iii) because S perceives herself to be in a competitive rather than cooperative conversation, and she wants to pursue her interests strategically (Asher, Lascarides, 2013; Camp, 2018; Lee, Pinker, 2010; Pinker et al., 2008). These views assume that to insinuate P, S must also intend to use the deniability of P for dealing with a possible non-cooperative hearer. I argue that this requirement is too strong and falls short of accounting for cases in which S intentionally performs a deniable indirect speech act, but S has no intention to use that deniability.

Intention and Responsibility in Demonstrative Reference. A View From the Speech Act Theory

Maciej Witek — Sun, 07 May 2023 07:51:29 +0200

DOI: https://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxvi2.04

Korta and Perry (2011) argue that the object a speaker refers to with a demonstrative expression combined with a pointing gesture is determined by her directing intention rather than by her demonstration. They acknowledge that our use of the ordinary concept of “what is said” is affected by our judgements about the speaker’s responsibility for the results of her careless pointing; however, they claim that the effects are perlocutionary and have no bearing on determining the referential content of the speaker’s act.

I argue that the consequences of careless pointing are illocutionary and play a role in determining demonstrative reference. I also distinguish between two types of referential content which are attributable to the speaker’s utterance and shape its discursive behaviour: what is intended, which is determined by the speaker’s directing intention, and what is public, which depends on what she can legitimately be held responsible for.

Zjawisko presupozycji z punktu widzenia teorii aktów mowy

Marek Nowak — Sun, 07 May 2023 07:52:00 +0200

DOI: https://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxvi2.05

Artykuł jest próbą opisu presupozycji w sensie Strawsona przy użyciu aparatury pojęciowej teorii aktów mowy. Porównanie dwóch pojęć, presupozycji propozycjonalnej Strawsona z presupozycją jako warunkiem przygotowawczym mocy illokucyjnej, prowadzi do wniosku, iż są to zupełnie różne pojęcia. Tymczasem w świetle intuicji językowej, dodatkowo opartej na pracy Austina (1962), wydaje się, że istnieje tylko jeden rodzaj presupozycji: warunki przygotowawcze. To oznaczałoby, iż presupozycja propozycjonalna presuponowana przez dane zdanie jest, w pewnym sensie, redukowalna do warunku przygotowawczego czynności illokucyjnej wykonywanej przez wypowiedzenie tego zdania. Ta hipoteza jest tutaj uzasadniana przez podanie przykładów presupozycji propozycjonalnych, presuponowanych przez zdania używane do wykonania elementarnych aktów illokucyjnych różnych typów.

The Pragmatic Theory—Truth Translated Into Action

Giulia Cirillo — Sun, 07 May 2023 07:52:29 +0200

DOI: https://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxvi2.06

Regardless of the form it may take, the process of translation still tends to be viewed as a technical activity, a cumbersome yet necessary operation to be performed in pursuit of higher goals. Yet as a phenomenon, with its profoundness it seems to be calling for closer attention. Thus the following work aims to prove how relevant the notion of translation is for the philosophical debate—specifically, for the enquiry into the nature of truth as considered from the pragmatic perspective. Firstly then, theories of the two fathers of pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce’s and William James’s, will be briefly recalled. Subsequently, the analysis will expose the role of translation process in each account. Recognition of the translative element will shed a new light on Peirce’s and James’s dispersed remarks concerning truth and offer an interesting ground on which they may be consolidated. Finally, the study yields a broader perspective on the idea of translation process as such, underscoring its philosophical potential.

Teoria prawdy Haima Gaifmana. Wątpliwości i zarzuty

Zbigniew Tworak — Sun, 07 May 2023 07:53:00 +0200

DOI: https://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxvi2.07

W artykule omawiam teorię prawdy zaproponowaną przez Haima Gaifmana z perspektywy radzenia sobie z różnymi problematycznymi zdaniami. Zamierzam pokazać, że koncepcja ta narażona jest na poważne zastrzeżenia, tak samo jak związana z nią teoria Saula Kripkego. Gaifman punktem wyjścia swojej teorii czyni łamigłówkę silnego kłamcy. W celu jej rozwiązania postuluje, by wartości logiczne przypisywać nie zdaniom-typom, lecz ich egzemplarzom. Przyjmuje ponadto, że wartość logiczna danego zdania-egzemplarza zależy nie tylko od leksykalnych i strukturalnych własności odpowiadającego mu zdania-typu, ale także od jego umiejscowienia w sieci powiązań zachodzących pomiędzy poszczególnymi zdaniami-egzemplarzami. Dwa egzemplarze tego samego zdania-typu mogą mieć różne wartości logiczne. Przedstawiona teoria jest więc paradygmatem kontekstualnej teorii prawdy. Pojęcie zdania-egzemplarza Gaifman zastępuje ogólniejszym od niego pojęciem znacznika. Wartość logiczna jest przypisywana znacznikowi przez odpowiedni algorytm (tzw. pointer semantics). Artykuł zawiera omówienie zarówno aparatu technicznego teorii Gaifmana, jak i jego wad.