

ZUZANA RYBAŘÍKOVÁ *

CLARITY AS A METHODOLOGICAL VALUE. ŁUSZCZEWSKA-ROMAHNOWA'S APPROACH¹

SUMMARY: The founder Kazimierz Twardowski made the requirement for clarity of philosophical style one of the important features of the Lvov-Warsaw School. However, there was no widely accepted definition of clarity. Certain members adopted radical positions on this question and rejected all unclear philosophical texts. By contrast, other members of the School felt that this position was too radical and had several drawbacks. Among those members was Seweryna Łuszczewska-Romahnowa. She was aware of the importance of a clear style in philosophy and pedagogy, and saw it as one of the great contributions of the Lvov-Warsaw School. However, she also stressed that the swift discarding of obscure texts can do more harm than good. She argued that, in philosophy as well as in science, even unclearly formulated theories can produce valuable results.

KEYWORDS: Lvov-Warsaw School, clarity, precision, clear philosophical style, Seweryna Łuszczewska-Romahnowa, Kazimierz Twardowski.

* The University of Ostrava. E-mail: zuzana.rybarikova@osu.cz. ORCID: 0000-0002-6128-1868.

¹ This topic was discussed at the *Women in Analytic Philosophy* conference and the *16th World Congress of the IASS/AIS*. The author is grateful to the attendees for their valuable comments. This article has been produced with the financial support of the European Union under the REFRESH—Research Excellence For REgion Sustainability and High-tech Industries project number CZ.10.03.01/00/22_003/0000048 via the Operational Programme Just Transition.

1. Introduction

Buekens and Boudry (2015, p. 3) argued that unclear communication is a flaw. This flaw is often ascribed to philosophy. Philosophy tends to be understood as an obscure and unclear discipline, full of complicated and ambiguous constructions. However, there were and still are a considerable number of philosophers who stress the importance of clear writing and speech, not just in philosophy but in science in general (see e.g., Będkowski, 2019b).

While an unclear style could be the product of careless or defective writing by an author, the reason for it might be considerably more vicious. An unclear style is often despised in certain branches of philosophy, as it is one of the immunising strategies used by pseudoscientists to fortify their theories against counterevidence. Examples of such a practice could be the misuse of equivocation, the shifting of the target or the redefining of key concepts, as mentioned by Boudry and Braeckman (2011, pp. 148–151) in their paper. This practice could be severely harmful in science as well as in real life.

This paper concerns Łuszczewska-Romahnowa's views on clear style in philosophy and in science. Although the topic has been regularly discussed in recent decades, clarity was also valued by the members of the Lvov-Warsaw School to which Łuszczewska-Romahnowa belonged. She was a member of the younger generation of the Lvov-Warsaw School, since she was a student of Twardowski but also of his students, primarily Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Roman Ingarden. She studied philosophy and mathematics at Lvov University between 1922 and 1928. Her teachers were therefore also the famous Polish mathematicians Hugo Steinhaus and Stefan Banach (see Murawski and Pogonowski, 2018, p. 241). The connection between philosophy and mathematics was important in several of her contributions. As will be presented below, one such contribution is her argument against an excessive demand for clarity.

This paper first introduces the concept of clear philosophical style and then describes its development in the Lvov-Warsaw School. It also addresses the difference between clarity and precision that both contribute to the clear philosophical style and which certain authors from the School differentiated. The paper then focuses on two of Łuszczewska-Romahnowa's contributions to the debate: her discussion of Kazimierz Twardowski's definition of clear philosophical style, its background and its implications, and her analysis of ambiguity in the language of science.

2. Clear Philosophical Style

The discussion on clarity and obscurity in speaking and writing is not new in philosophy. Even Heraclitus was called 'dark' by his contemporaries, and this was not praise (Joll, 2009, p. 13). However, despite there being agreement on the importance of clear philosophical style, the definitions of clarity are sparse (see Joll, 2009, p. 1; Hobbs, 2014, p. 29). The absence of a unified definition of clear

philosophical style, as will be shown using the example of the Lvov-Warsaw School, led to heated debates and accusations that writers and thinkers were unclear, similar to those previously levelled at Heraclitus. Although there are philosophers who admit to certain ambiguities in their philosophical style (e.g. Michel Foucault (see Kjeldgaard-Christiansen, 2023, pp. 1–2)), this is not a widespread trait.

Jacek Jadacki (2018, pp. 26–27), who followed the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School, claimed there are several angles from which clarity (or a lack of clarity) in philosophy could be understood:

- the issue has to be accessible to clear presentation,
- the author has to think clearly,
- the author has to be able to write/present his or her ideas clearly.

Besides Jadacki's specification, there is another requirement discussed recently. Namely,

- the author has to intend to write clearly

as certain authors deliberately talk or write in an obscure way, having various possible maleficent motivations to do so. Those authors would be able to write clearly as none of the previously mentioned issues occur, but they chose not to. This approach is entitled 'obscurantism'. Buckens and Boudry (2015, pp. 1–2) define obscurantism as the attempt to obscure the meaning of the words of a given theory.² In this way, the aim of obscurantism is to manifest depth and profound insight where there is none. If the drawbacks and dangers of an unclear style in philosophy and in science are mentioned, this primarily concerns obscurantism. Buckens and Boudry (2015, p. 15) argue as follows:

The effects of obscurantism are pernicious because the honest reader or interpreter is forced to stretch principles of rational accommodation and interpretive charity to unreasonable limits [...]

Like Jadacki with his definition, authors from the Lvov-Warsaw School did not discuss obscurantism, but only the three other options for the reasons for unclear style. However, as obscurantism is the most vicious version of unclear style, it might be fruitful to include it in the debate.

3. The Discussion on Clarity in the Lvov-Warsaw School

Clear philosophical style became important in the School because of its founder Kazimierz Twardowski, who stressed the significance of clarity during

² There are authors (e.g. Bien, 2021, p. 1514) who also ascribe obscurantism to those who produce unclear text inadvertently. In this paper, the term 'obscurantism' will, however, be used only for deliberately unclear text.

his seminars and lectures.³ Woleński (1997, p. 85) claimed that Twardowski disagreed with the widespread view that philosophy is intrinsically complicated and difficult and cannot be presented clearly and comprehensively. Twardowski (1919, pp. 25–26) noticed in his paper ‘On clear and obscure styles of philosophical writing’ that certain philosophers tend to write unclearly. He excluded cases when the philosophical writing was preserved only in a corrupted version or when the author wrote hastily and carelessly. In those cases, the obscurity of the texts is caused by external factors. Then, he asked whether it is possible that philosophers who could address the problem in their mind clearly are not able to present it clearly due to the complexity of philosophical issues.

Twardowski’s answer was no. According to him, the complexity and depth of philosophical issues are for many philosophers merely an excuse for writing in an obscure manner. He pointed out that several philosophers could write clearly, even about complex philosophical issues.⁴ Thus, he deemed the excuse unfounded. Twardowski argued that their obscure philosophical style is not a matter of the complexity of philosophical issues, but rather a reflection of their obscure way of thinking. Consequently, he equated obscure philosophical style with obscure thinking. As Twardowski (1919/1979, p. 2) wrote in his paper:

Now if the above remarks are correct, then they largely free us from the duty to rack our brains over what the author of a philosophical work had in mind when writing in an obscure style. This is worth the effort only if we already have grounds for believing that he thought clearly. [...] But if we do not have such a belief, then we may quietly assume that an author who does not know how to express his thoughts clearly does not know how to think clearly either, and therefore his thoughts do not deserve our efforts to guess them.

Brożek (2015, p. 46) pointed out that Twardowski’s paper began a vivid discussion in Polish philosophy. The discussion concerned, on the one hand, the position of clarity in philosophical style and, on the other, the connection between language and thinking. The members of his School widely acknowledged the importance of clear philosophical style. However, there were disagreements on how it should be achieved, and consequently on the understanding of the term (see Woleński 1989, pp. 44–45). This might be caused by the fact that, despite the widely accepted position on clarity, no deep analysis of it appeared from the Lvov-Warsaw School (see Brożek et al., 2020, p. 194).

A prominent member of the Lvov-Warsaw School, Jan Łukasiewicz (1949–1954/2013, p. 67), appreciated the *clarity* of Twardowski’s pedagogical and philosophical style but also valued *precision*. He claimed that he did not find precision in Twardowski but learnt it from another representative of the School

³ Nonetheless, Twardowski was not the originator of this requirement. He (1926/1999, pp. 20, 22) adopted it from his former professor Franz Brentano.

⁴ Będkowski (2019a, pp. 90–91) argued that Twardowski himself was a great representative of this approach. As the records from his students show, he was able to explain even complex philosophical issues clearly, which contributed to his success as a teacher and the founder of the School.

Stanisław Leśniewski. Doing this differentiation, it seems Łukasiewicz identified precision with mathematical logic. The identification was adopted also by other members of the School. For instance, Grzegorzczuk (2000, 89) argued that there is no precision beyond mathematical logic. Clarity was defined as a counter part of obscurity, precision as a counter part of ambiguity (see Przełęcki 1998, 209).

However, clarity and precision were also often simultaneously required. Thus, Łukasiewicz (1927/1998, pp. 41–42) doubted all the previous philosophical tradition as it did not use a scientific method (i.e. mathematical logic, as this, according to him, was the scientific method to be used in philosophy). This caused a lack of clarity and precision in previous philosophers' writings and consequently disqualified their work from scientific philosophy.

Leśniewski used a similar strategy when he employed the phrase 'I do not understand' as a weapon against his opponents (see Czeżowski, 1969, p. 197). Since these philosophers considered mathematical logic a guarantee of clarity and precision in philosophy, they were suspicious of other philosophical methods and topics outside logic and mathematics (see Witwicki, 1919-1920/2016, pp. 73–78). This strict understanding of what was meant by a clear philosophical style caused disagreement in the Lvov-Warsaw School.

Other members of the School opposed the narrow understanding of clarity and precision proposed by these logicians. As can be seen from Twardowski's quote, he (1919/1979, p. 2) admitted that there could be external reasons for an unclear philosophical style. Consequently, even obscure text can be written by a clearly thinking author if the circumstances are not favourable to him or her. In addition, Twardowski argued against excessive use of mathematical logic in his paper 'Symbolomania and Pragmatophobia'. He did not see it as a more precise tool than natural language. He claimed that what could be expressed in formal language could be expressed similarly precisely in natural language (see Jadacki 2021, pp. 23–26).

Czeżowski (1969, pp. 197–198) argued that it is difficult to balance a legitimate request for clarity against disrespect to one's opponent or even an *ad hominem* attack. Although clarity itself is vital in the philosophical debate, the phrase 'I do not understand' might, in many cases, be inappropriate, as the lack of clarity is just one of the many causes that could inflict a misunderstanding. Another could occur when a layman aims to understand a text for professionals, or a philosopher outside a particular philosophical group aims to understand the language of that group.⁵ Witwicki (1919-1920/2016, pp. 72–74) also stressed that the axiomatic method is not the only guarantee of clear writing. On the contrary, according to him, logical formalization might make a text genuinely obscure to some readers. Seweryna Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (1977, pp. 121–123) agreed with the latter representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School. As will be explained

⁵ Even in 1919, Ingarden (1919) raised similar objections to Twardowski's paper.

in what follows, she pointed out that exaggerated emphasis on clarity can do more harm than good.⁶

4. Seweryna Łuszczewska-Romahnowa on Clarity and Precision

Seweryna Łuszczewska-Romahnowa discussed clarity and precision on several occasions. This paper will focus on two of them: her discussions of clarity in Kazimierz Twardowski's work and of ambiguity in the language of science. The presentation is ahistorical, as Łuszczewska-Romahnowa published her paper on ambiguity in 1948, while her papers on Twardowski appeared later. Nonetheless, ambiguity of terms is an issue partially linked with clear philosophical style. Therefore, it will be presented later.

4.1. The Request for Clarity in Twardowski's Work

Łuszczewska-Romahnowa devoted part of her work to the discussion of contributions by older members of the Lvov-Warsaw School. As will be further explored in the section below about ambiguity in the language of science, she was primarily inspired by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. Nonetheless, she also discussed Tadeusz Kotarbiński's *Collected Papers* and Kazimierz Twardowski's philosophy (see Łuszczewska-Romahnowa, 1959, 1967, 1977).

Discussing Kotarbiński's contribution, Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (1959, p. 157) mentioned his impact on the development and spread of logical culture at universities. The concept of logical culture contained, inter alia, the request for clarity and precision. However, as Twardowski was the initiator of the discussion on clear philosophical style in the Lvov-Warsaw School, Łuszczewska-Romahnowa presented her ideas mainly through commenting on his work. Her ideas are more developed in the discussion in the paper of 1967 (see Łuszczewska-Romahnowa, 1967, pp. 159–163). The 1977 paper mostly repeats ideas that were introduced in the previous one (see Łuszczewska-Romahnowa, 1977, pp. 121–123).

In her 1967 paper, Łuszczewska-Romahnowa focused on Twardowski's scientific philosophy. Introducing Twardowski's methodology, she also dealt with his paper 'On clear and obscure styles of philosophical writing', and the postulate of clarity that is stressed in that paper. In her paper, Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (1967, p. 161) described clarity in text as precision, logical correctness and a lack of ambiguity, and maintained that clarity is an absolute value of the text.

⁶ Besides these drawbacks in respect to clear philosophical style, Twardowski mentioned another issue in his autobiography. He (1926/1999, p. 30) admitted that his own insistence on clarity, precision and accuracy caused the process of writing and publishing his own works to be very painstaking for him, and delayed, or even prevented, many of his publications.

Discussing Twardowski's famous paper, she (1967, p. 160) argued that Twardowski's claims in them are severe. His conclusion that an obscure philosophical style might imply that its author is not able to think clearly, and consequently that his writings are not worth reading, suggests a strict evaluation of any obscure philosophical text. However, Twardowski had a temperate and cautious personality. It therefore seemed strange to her that he would have promoted such a view. As has already been mentioned, certain of his students had no scruples in advocating such a reading, but Łuszczewska-Romahnowa disagreed with them.

She (1967, pp. 160–161) pointed out that the request for clarity became one of the most important features of the Lvov-Warsaw School. It has two sides. On the one hand, the members of the School had it in mind when working on their writings. They aimed to formulate their philosophical views as clearly as possible. This had a positive impact not just on their writings but also on their pedagogy. A clear philosophical style attracted and amused their students, who then spread logical culture into Polish philosophy. Łuszczewska-Romahnowa's work would be a great demonstration of this spread. As one of her PhD students, Tadeusz Batóg (1979, p. 191), reported:

All the works of Prof. S. Romahnowa are written with extraordinary clarity and in a high logical culture. In this respect, she was a faithful torchbearer of the traditions of the Lvov school.

On the other hand, there was a negative side of the feature, namely that a strict reading of Twardowski's request led certain members of the Lvov-Warsaw School to a denial of any unclear philosophical texts and theories. As mentioned previously, this practice arose primarily among the logicians of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (1967, pp. 161–162) pointed out that, from a scientific point of view, this might not always be very advantageous. Specifically, she argued that certain important theories were formulated unclearly.

Since the second subject she studied at Lvov University was mathematics, she chose infinitesimal calculus as her example. She pointed out that the invention of infinitesimal calculus would barely have met the requirement for clarity, at the beginning. The basic elements of the calculus were defined vaguely and the relationship between them was unclear. Although the calculus was not clearly defined, one of its inventors, G. W. Leibniz, advocated its use, since it had already had fruitful results. The whole theory was just clarified over time, in the nineteenth century. If mathematicians had refused to use this unclear theory at the beginning, it might never have been clarified and they would have been without it and its applications. Nonetheless, the mathematicians who criticised its obscure foundations contributed to its clarification, as they stressed the need for it. Consequently, ambiguity and lack of clarity, despite being unwelcome, should not always discourage researchers from dwelling on the theory (see Łuszczewska-Romahnowa 1967, pp. 161–162).

4.2. Ambiguity and the Language of Science

In her paper *Ambiguity and the Language of Science*, Łuszczewska-Romahnowa focused on one feature of obscure style, the ambiguity of terms, or more precisely the terms of science.⁷ She (1948/1979, pp. 148–150) disagreed with the widespread view that the language of science contains fewer ambiguous and obscure terms than the ordinary language from which it evolves. Such ambiguities and obscurities are unwelcomed in science, as they could lead to misunderstanding and errors. However, science is not concerned with specifying its language entirely, as eliminating all ambiguities might not be possible. Nevertheless, science is usually able to avoid the previously mentioned issues. Łuszczewska-Romahnowa dealt with this tension in her paper as she aimed to explain how this is possible.

To stress how ambiguity is intrinsic to the language of science, Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (1948/1979, p. 150) chose an example from linguistics:

“The vocabulary of the French language includes the names of shades of colours which have no names in the Polish language.” “For instance, the words ‘*beige*’ and ‘*mauve*’ are names of shades of colours, and occur in the vocabulary of the French language; they denote shades of colours which have no names in the Polish language.

“This can be proved by the fact that a certain French-Polish dictionary (which is both comprehensive and reliable and a copy of which we are using here) includes these words as words occurring in the French language which name, in that language, certain shades of colour; at the same time this dictionary does not include any Polish words which might be translations of these French words.”⁸

Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (1948/1979, pp. 150-152) stressed in the text that the terms ‘French language’, ‘Polish language’, ‘word in French language’ or ‘word in Polish language’ could also have several meanings. For instance, ‘French language’ could mean spoken or written language, it could be the language of the upper class, the language of dictionaries, some kind of dialect, argot, and so on.

She (1948/1979, pp. 152–153) focused on the structure of the argument and its audience; that is, she examined the argument from the point of view of the

⁷ Chybińska (2015, p. 84) pointed out that Łuszczewska-Romahnowa did not elaborate on her understanding of ambiguity. She (2016, pp. 88–97) also argued that Łuszczewska-Romahnowa was not successful in proving that ambiguity is not always destructive for science. Łuszczewska-Romahnowa did not describe in detail the various forms of the ambiguity of terms and therefore did not consider those cases that could be disastrous to science.

⁸ The quotation marks are in the original text.

theory of argumentation. She identified the first sentence as a conclusion, and the second and third as premises, with the third developing the second:

1. The words ‘*beige*’ and ‘*mauve*’ are names of shades of colours, and occur in the vocabulary of the French language; they denote shades of colours which have no names in the Polish language.

1.1. This can be proved by the fact that a certain French-Polish dictionary (which is both comprehensive and reliable and a copy of which we are using here) includes these words as words occurring in the French language which name, in that language, certain shades of colour; at the same time this dictionary does not include any Polish words which might be translations of these French words.

The vocabulary of the French language includes the names of shades of colours which have no names in the Polish language.

Thus, the aim of the argument is to support the conclusion that certain words in French have no direct representatives in Polish. She named all the assumptions that follow from this conclusion ‘Z’.

As the argument concerns dictionaries, she claimed that it would be reasonable to expect that the previously mentioned ambiguous words and phrases ‘French language’, ‘Polish language’, ‘word in French language’ and ‘word in Polish language’ relate to dictionaries. ‘French language’ and ‘Polish language’ are, therefore, literary French and literary Polish. The differentiation between spoken and written language makes no difference in accepting the conclusion of the argument, according to Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (1948/1979, pp. 153–155). The clarification of the genre would make the language sufficient to avoid misunderstanding and errors, even though the argument still contains ambiguous terms. Consequently, Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (1948/1979, pp. 153–155) concluded that a certain amount of ambiguity is not fatal for arguments in science. Specifically, the ambiguity is not vicious if the different interpretations do not lead to different truth-evaluations of statements.⁹

Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (1948/1979, pp. 156–158) argued that the interpretation of terms could change on several occasions – for example, if a researcher addressed his claims to his or her colleagues or to laymen. Therefore, the inaccessibility (lack of clarity) of scientific works in a certain context should not be considered as a failure. It could just be the case that the text was written for professionals and therefore is difficult for laymen. The scientific argument has to be accessible and convincing to those to whom it is addressed. By contrast,

⁹ Ajdukiewicz (1974, pp. 49–50) adopted a similarly moderate approach to ambiguous expressions in his book *Pragmatic Logic*. He argued that ambiguity is acceptable if it does not lead to misunderstanding between participants in the communication. He (1974, p. 49) claimed: “... it would be excessive pedantry to prohibit the use of ambiguous expressions in those situations in which there is no risk of misunderstanding.” As Ajdukiewicz was Łuszczewska-Romahnowa’s professor who considerably affected her, she might have adopted this approach from him.

cases where the statements of an argument possess different truth-values because of ambiguous terms are representatives of vicious ambiguity that should be avoided in science.

5. Conclusion

In her work, Łuszczewska-Romahnowa criticized a narrow understanding of what is meant by clear philosophical style, and pointed out that this interpretation would not be faithful to Twardowski, the originator of the idea. She also pointed out that science does not concern itself with clarifying its language entirely, as eliminating all ambiguities might not be possible. She claimed that a certain amount of ambiguity is not fatal for arguments in science.

At the same time, Łuszczewska-Romahnowa followed the positive aspects of clear philosophical style in her entire work. The issues in her works are clearly presented and discussed. Like the logicians from the Lvov-Warsaw School, she often utilized formalization of arguments. In addition, her definition of clarity was close to their understanding of it.

Although clear philosophical style was an important issue in the Lvov-Warsaw School, obscurantism did not occur in their discussions of the topic. Instead, they argued, following Twardowski, that an unclear philosophical style is very often a sign of the unclear thinking of the author. However, their practice of avoiding an unclear philosophical style might work as an antidote to this danger, both in their own writings and in their acceptance of the writings of others. Nonetheless, Czeżowski's critique of Leśniewski's practice, as well as Łuszczewska-Romahnowa's analysis of clarity and ambiguity, remind us that unclear style is not always a defect and that an opponent's accusation that writing is unclear should be considered wisely.

REFERENCES

- Ajdukiewicz, K. (1974). *Pragmatic Logic*. Dordrecht; Boston: Reidel.
- Batóg, T. (1979). Seweryna Łuszczewska-Romahnowa. *Studia Filozoficzne*, 1(158), 189–194.
- Będkowski, M. (2019a). „Jasnościowcy”. O stylu naukowym Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej z perspektywy idei prostego języka (rekonesans). *Oblicza Komunikacji*, 11, 87–106.
- Będkowski, M. (2019b). Nauczyć krytycznego myślenia i jasnej mowy. Postulaty krytycyzmu i jasności a sprawa tzw. logiki ogólnej. *Studia Semiotyczne*, 33(2), 167–183.
- Bien, E. N. (2021). How Obscurantism Differs From Bullshit: A Proposal. *Theoria*, 87(6), 1497–1526.
- Boudry, M., Braeckman, J. (2011). Immunizing Strategies and Epistemic Defense Mechanisms. *Philosophia*, 39(1), 145–161.

- Brożek, A. (2015). Myślenie a mówienie. Na marginesie uwag Kazimierza Twardowskiego. *Analiza i Egzystencja: czasopismo filozoficzne*, 29, 45–60.
- Brożek, A., Będkowski, M., Chybińska, A., Ivanyk, S., Traczykowski, D. (2020). *Anti-Irrationalism. Philosophical Methods in the Lvov-Warsaw School*. Warsaw: Semper.
- Buekens, F., Boudry, M. (2015). The Dark Side of the Loon. Explaining the Temptations of Obscurantism. *Theoria*, 81(2), 126–142.
- Chybińska, A. (2015), Łuszczewska-Romahnowa o wieloznaczności w języku naukowym – analiza i krytyka. In D. Łukasiewicz, R. Mordarski (Eds.), *Kobiety w Szkole Lwowsko-Warszawskiej* (pp. 83–98). Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego.
- Czeżowski, T. (1969). Zarzut niejasności (przyczynek do teorii dyskusji). In: T. Czeżowski (Ed.), *Odczyty filozoficzne* (2nd Ed.) (pp. 197–200). Toruń: Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu.
- Grzegorzczak, A. (2000). Czy istnieje ścisłość poza wymaganiami logiki [Is There Precision Beyond the Requirements of Logic]. In J. Pelc (Ed.), *Język współczesnej humanistyki* [The Language of contemporary humanities] (pp. 89–95). Warsaw: Znak-Język-Rzeczywistość.
- Hobbs, V. (2014). Accounting for the Great Divide: Features of Clarity in Analytic Philosophy Journal Articles. *Journal of English for Academic Purposes*, 15, 27–36.
- Hobbs, V. (2015). Looking Again at Clarity in Philosophy: Writing as a Shaper and Sharpener of Thought. *Philosophy*, 90(1), 135–142.
- Ingarden, R. (1919). O jasnym i niejasnym stylu filozoficznym. *Ruch Filozoficzny*, V(3), 45–48.
- Jadacki, J. (2018). Jeszcze o jasności myśli i mowy (w nawiązaniu do jednego z artykułów programowych Kazimierza Twardowskiego). *Filo-Sofija*, 40(1), 23–39.
- Jadacki, J. (2021). Good Work in Philosophy. In P. Stalmaszczyk, M. Tałasiewicz (Eds.), *The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy of Language* (pp. 16–34). Leiden: Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004471146_003
- Joll, N. (2009). How Should Philosophy Be Clear? Loaded Clarity, Default Clarity, and Adorno. *Telos*, 146, 73–95.
- Kjeldgaard-Christiansen, J. (2023). Obscurantism in Academic Writing: What It Is and Why It Is Bad. *Leviathan: Interdisciplinary Journal in English*, 9, 1–17.
- Łukasiewicz, J. L. (1927/1998). O metodę w filozofii. In J. J. Jadacki (Ed.), *Logika i Metafizyka* (pp. 41–42). Warsaw: Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
- Łukasiewicz, J. L. (1949–1954/2013). *Pamiętnik*. Warsaw: Semper.
- Łuszczewska-Romahnowa, S. (1948/1979). Ambiguity and the Language of Science. In J. Pelc (Ed.), *Semiotics in Poland 1894–1969* (pp. 148–159). Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, Warsaw: PWN.
- Łuszczewska-Romahnowa, S. (1959). Z okazji wydania II tomu „Wyboru pism” Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego. *Studia Filozoficzne*, 3, 154–162.

- Łuszczewska-Romahnowa, S. (1967). Program filozofii naukowej Kazimierza Twardowskiego. *Studia Filozoficzne*, 4, 154–168.
- Łuszczewska-Romahnowa, S. (1977). Teoria wiedzy Kazimierza Twardowskiego. In B. Skarga (Ed.), *Polska myśl filozoficzna i społeczna* (Vol. III) (pp. 86–125). Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza.
- Murawski, R., Pogonowski, J. (2018). Seweryna Łuszczewska-Romahnowa. In Á. Garrido, U. Wybraniec-Skardowska (Eds.), *The Lvov-Warsaw School. Past and Present*. Cham: Birkhäuser. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65430-0_18
- Twardowski, K. (1919). O jasnym i niejasnym stylu filozoficznym [On Clear and Obscure Styles of Philosophical Writing]. *Ruch filozoficzny*, V(2), 25–27.
- Twardowski, K. (1919/1979). On Clear and Obscure Styles of Philosophical Writing. In J. Pelc (Ed.), *Semiotics in Poland 1984–1968* (pp. 1–2). Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, Warsaw: PWN.
- Twardowski, K. (1926/1999). Self-Portrait. In J. Brandl, J. Wolenski (Eds.), *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy* (pp. 17–31). Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Witwicki, W. (1919–1920/2016). Z listów Władysława Witwickiego do Kazimierza Twardowskiego. In J. J. Jadacki (Ed.), *Stanisław Leśniewski, geniusz logiki* (pp. 72–88). Bydgoszcz: Epigram.
- Woleński, J. (1989). *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher.
- Woleński, J. (1997). Jasność, symbolomania, pragmatofobia. In J. Woleński, *Szkoła Lwowsko-Warszawska w polemikach* (pp. 85–96). Warsaw: Scholar.