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Article

MICHAŁ ROMAN WĘSIERSKI *

HOW TO BE A GOOD PHILOSOPHER. TOWARDS THE LVOV-WARSAW GENERATIONS RELAY

SUMMARY: This article attempts to reconstruct Jerzy Pelc's metaphilosophical and metascientific position. The issues raised in the text relate to the style of work and approaches characteristic of the Lvov-Warsaw School, whose achievements Pelc cultivated and sought to continue, and which influenced his understanding of the role of the philosopher and the tasks of philosophy (including logical semiotics). The paper presents Pelc's position on the status of philosophy and the pattern (standard) he postulated for conducting philosophical research, the methodological model for the humanities. It also examines the research stance Pelc assumed and discusses the fundamental criteria for scientific evaluation he presented. In addition, Pelc's requirements related to the use of the language of the humanities are addressed, and his role and his guidelines for teaching at the university level are discussed. Furthermore, the paper addresses issues related to the institutional and organisational dimensions of scientific activity, a field in which Pelc had extensive experience. The final part of the text contains a summary of key theses, accepted general methodological standards, recommendations and guidelines regarding the issues under consideration.

KEYWORDS: Jerzy Pelc, metaphilosophy, science, humanities, language, academic standards, the Lvov-Warsaw School.

* Warsaw University of Life Sciences—SGGW, Institute of Sociological Sciences and Pedagogy. E-mail: michal_wesierski@sggw.edu.pl. ORCID: 0000-0002-3081-2160.

1. Introduction

The Lvov-Warsaw School (hereinafter: LWS) constituted a crystallisation of a certain model of practising philosophy and solving philosophical problems. The influence of Polish analytical philosophers who were members of this school was very wide and not limited only to philosophy. The impact of subsequent generations of this school on Polish science (including the humanities and social sciences) is noticeable after the end of the Second World War as well. By analyzing the literature and the tradition of the didactic work of the founders and subsequent continuators of this school, it is possible to reconstruct the general normative position regarding the accepted methodological and ethical pattern of scientific work, especially in the field of the humanities.

Members of the LWS held the same or very similar views on the style of practising philosophy, its basic tasks, methods and argumentation strategies. They were united by a common vision of philosophy and they had an interest in similar research problems. However, not all of them were concerned with metaphilosophical matters. A special role in the continuation and popularisation of the ideas propagated by the LWS fell to Jerzy Pelc, founder of the Department of Logical Semiotics at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Warsaw and long-time President of the Polish Semiotic Society.[1] As an academic teacher and an influential organiser of scientific life, Pelc significantly contributed to the dissemination in Poland of methodological standards specific to the tradition of analytical philosophy. If we assume that Kazimierz Twardowski was the founding father of the Lvov-Warsaw School and at the same time a member of its first generation, and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Tadeusz Czeżowski – of the second, then Pelc (or, as other examples, his close friends Marian Przełęcki and Klemens Szaniawski, all three born in the 1920s), can be counted as members of the third, post-war generation of this school.[2]

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[1] Among the many official functions performed by J. Pelc, it is worth mentioning that he was a full member of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences and a full member of the Warsaw Scientific Society. He was also, among others, the chairman of the Central Commission for Academic Titles and Degrees (for two terms), chairman of the Committee on Ethics in Science at the Presidium of the Polish Academy of Sciences, member and honorary chairman of the International Institute of Philosophy (Institut International de Philosophie, IIP), chairman of the International Semiotic Society, founder and managing editor of the "Semiotic Studies" ("Studia Semiotyczne") periodical, co-founder and managing editor of the publishing series Library of Semiotic Thought ("Biblioteka Myśli Semiotycznej").

[2] It must be noted that there are many syntheses and studies devoted to the history and scientific achievements of the LWS and its individual representatives (cf. Skolimowski, 1967; Woleński, 1985; idem ,1989; Jadacki, 2009; idem, 2017; idem, 2018a; Brożek, 2018; Brożek et all 2021; see also Jadacki, Paśniczek, 2006; Wybraniec-Skardowska, 2018). Attention devoted to research on the history of the school indicates the role it played in (not only Polish) science.

Some controversy exists as to whether the LWS continued to exist after the end of the Second World War. But beyond these reservations, there is no doubt that after 1945, as an analytical school, it had its numerous successors. Some of them (and J. Pelc, for example, belonged to this group) considered themselves members of this school. The post-war influence on the next generation of philosophers is visible in the case of specific academic centres in which members of the LWS were active after 1945, e.g. Warsaw (Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbiński, Stanisław Ossowski and Maria Ossowska), Poznań (Ajdukiewicz), Łódź (Kotarbiński, Ossowska), Toruń (Czeżowski), Kraków (Izydora Dąmbska). In these places, there emerged numerous direct and indirect successors of the tradition of analytic philosophy. Figuratively speaking, the relay race that Twardowski and Łukasiewicz started at the turn of the 19th century continued in the second half of the 20th century in numerous scientific centres throughout Poland, despite ideological pressure from the communist authorities.

The aim of the paper is to present the metaphilosophical position taken by Jerzy Pelc, expressed in the texts he published and implemented in his teaching practice. Based on the reading of these works and taking into account the requirements implemented in teaching work, a specific normative perspective emerges, defining a set of guidelines (directives and recommendations) regarding the way of practising philosophy, including logical semiotics, as well as conducting humanities research as such. Pelc's preferred style of practising philosophy clearly reflects the approach promoted by his own academic teachers and, going back, the teachers of those teachers.

This article is an attempt to collect Pelc's views related to the practice of science and the preparation of philosophical works, as well as to reconstruct his general metaphilosophical and metascientific position. It is only a preliminary sketch of the reconstruction of the metascientific and metaphilosophical issues in question; it does not raise any philosophical problems in the narrow sense of the word. The order of reconstructions appearing in the text is the reverse of the temporal order associated with the work of individual philosophers, i.e. the relationships that exist in philosophical schools between creators and their successors and, respectively, teachers and their students.

The title of this work is intended to reflect primarily the spirit (main idea) and not the letter of all the detailed research problems discussed in it. In reference to the title of the article, it should be emphasised that Pelc did not treat the practice of philosophy in isolation from other areas of the humanities. The fundamental metascientific remarks which he formulated can be extended to all humanities, not just philosophy itself. In his approach, the basic methodological standards set for the humanities refer to all the scientific disciplines that constitute (or co-create) them, including philosophy. According to Pelc, to be a good philosopher

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In his short autobiography, Pelc mentioned that his parents attended Kazimierz Twardowski's lectures at the Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov in their youth (Pelc, 1987, p. 76). It can therefore be said that in his case, the continuation of the LWS tradition had a broader intergenerational dimension.

of language, or, in other words, of the logical theory of language, was simply to be a good scholar, i.e. a professional dealing with a specific issue – in this case, language – in the proper way.

As an academic teacher and an influential organiser of scientific life, Pelc significantly contributed to the dissemination in Poland of methodological standards specific to the tradition of analytical philosophy.[3] Pelc held to his views consistently and steadfastly throughout his entire academic career. He cultivated traditional academic values and condemned any departures from them. Having chosen his research interests while still a student, he remained faithful to them until the end of his academic career. During his career, Pelc did not undergo any changes in his views on philosophy or the way of practising it. Not only did he not change his preferences related to the research problems that interested him, but what is more, he consistently, for several decades, promoted those ideas and concepts that corresponded to his broad view of the sciences of cognition and communication. His forum for their promotion was first the seminar he ran from 1961, and then the pages of "Studia Semiotyczne" (for 45 years) as well as works within the Library of Semiotic Thought (Polish: "Biblioteka Myśli Semiotycznej") publishing series (from the early 1990s).

It is worth mentioning that several works have been written on the scientific achievements and organisational activities of Jerzy Pelc, including those devoted to biographical threads from his life (Ciecierski, 2017; Woleński, 2017; Jadacki 2018b). Articles have also been published on some of the philosophical problems he analyzed (see Będkowski, 2018; Muszyński, 2018; Odrowąż-Sypniewska 2018; eadem 2021; Puczyłowski, 2018; Grabarczyk, 2021; cf. also Będkowski, 2019; Horecka 2018; Szubka, 2019). Professor Pelc was also devoted to a special issue of "Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria" (2018, no. 2), "Studia Semiotyczne" (2019, vol. 33, no. 2) and "Semiotica" (2021, issue 240). In 1996, a jubilee book in honour of Professor Pelc entitled *W świecie znaków* was published, edited by Jacek J. Jadacki and Witold Strawiński (1996); its English edition *In the World of Signs* (Jadacki, Strawiński, 1998) appeared two years later. The articles included in both volumes were not directly devoted to Pelc's philosophical concepts; some of those concepts, such as the functional theory of natural language, have been developed or adapted (Ciecierski, 2018; idem, 2021; Boruszewski, 2021; Węsierski, 2021).

2. Preliminary Issues

As a starting point, two questions must be asked: What problem areas (detailed fields) does the metaphilosophical and metascientific reflection cover?

[3] Pelc not only helped to disseminate the achievements of the members of the LWS abroad (cf. Pelc, 1971b; idem, 1978), but also facilitated the dissemination of the achievements of contemporary Polish philosophers of language (e.g. Leon Koj). Pelc also popularized the works of Western philosophers of language to Polish readers (cf. idem, 1960; idem, 1967).

What types of sentences do we encounter regarding these issues? Jerzy Pelc's meta-philosophical and meta-scientific reflection covers the following five areas (fields): (a) methodological status of philosophy and the humanities; (b) research attitude and scientific evaluation criteria; (c) conversational practices in social sciences and humanities and the use of scientific language; (d) teaching (at university level), and (f) institutional and organisational issues related to scientific activity.

Jerzy Pelc's position and views on these matters were presented primarily in his numerous articles and polemics, as well as his memoirs. Works on these topics have been published over a period of nearly twenty years (see Pelc, 1995a; idem, 1995b; idem, 1995c; idem, 1996a; idem, 1997; idem, 1998; idem, 1999; idem, 2000b; idem, 2000c; idem, 2001b; idem, 2006; idem, 2008; idem, 2009; idem, 2015a). Most of the works devoted to metaphilosophical and metascientific matters were written after Pelc retired (which happened in the academic year 1994/1995).[4] Pelc admitted that he raised certain problems and topics because of the specific official functions he performed (Pelc, 2008, p. 602-603); many of these works were his direct response to the existing situation (criticized by him) in Polish and world humanities. A good example here are problems concerning research attitudes and scientific evaluation criteria and use of scientific terms and the style of linguistic expressions existing in contemporary humanities. It should be added that some of the principles, guidelines and suggestions were expounded during his teaching courses, in lectures, seminars and exercises. Moreover, Pelc included his remarks in handwritten comments on the printouts of seminar papers given to him by his students for evaluation.

The types of sentences mentioned above can be divided as follows: meta-scientific theses; meta-philosophical theses; praxeological directives; advice; general recommendations; suggestions; wishes; assessments; valuations. These individual types of sentences can be collected and assigned to specific problem areas or domains. When these sentences are collected and compared, there clearly emerges a certain metascientific and metaphilosophical perspective that is specific to Pelc's position. Sentences under consideration differ in their degree of categoricality. Such sentences (theses, norms, assessments, recommendations, etc.) can be divided into strong and weak ones, that is, ones more or less restrictive in terms of their content, but also more or less binding or obliging the receiver to specific actions. A special table is provided here to illustrate this issue (see Table 1).

[4] After 1994, Pelc worked at the Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology of the University of Warsaw as a contract professor, teaching the Sign – Language – Reality seminar as well as giving lectures and exercises in logical semiotics held at the Institute of Philosophy.

Table 1

Problem Areas (Domains), Types of Sentences and the Degree of Categoricality of Sentences Expressing the Metascientific and Metaphilosophical Position of Jerzy Pelc

Categoricality of Statement	Type of Sentences			
	Theses	Norms and Methodological Standards	Recommendations, Suggestions, Wishes	Valuations and Assessments
Strong	methodological status of philosophy and the humanities	research attitude; scientific language; teachers' duties; institutional issues	conversational practices	institutional and organisational issues
Weak			teachers' obligations; organisational and institutional issues	

The following sections of this paper provide examples of such principles, guidelines, assessments and valuations relating to specific problem areas (the fields under discussion). A summary of the key sentences in question can be found in the penultimate part of this article.

It should be added here that many of the issues raised by Pelc (analyzed within the framework of given problem areas) were interwoven in his publications. For example, when Pelc wrote about the role of philosophy and the status of philosophy, he also commented on the language used by philosophers; he did so also when he raised the issue of the scientific nature of the humanities. He wrote about language also when dealing with the role to be played by teachers in schools of various levels, including academic teachers. When he raised the issue of scientific activity, he concurrently commented on the research attitude that should be required of scientists. When he referred to the requirements imposed on scientists, he drew attention to the organisational and institutional issues of scientific and didactic work at universities, etc.

3. Philosophy, Science, Humanities and Semiotics

Pelc advocated a model of philosophical research propagated within the framework of the idea of scientific philosophy. This idea is known to have been shared by the members of LWS. Behind it stood a minimalist program: the role of philosophy was limited to solving specific problems considered philosophical in a scientific manner.[5] In the approach, represented e.g. by Wittgenstein (cf. idem, 1921/1922, theses 4.111-4.113), Moritz Schlick (idem, 1930/1931) or Rudolf Carnap (idem, 1932), the above idea was reduced to the logical analysis of language (preferably scientific one, and in particular the language of physics; the logical analysis in question primarily involves determining the admissibility of reasoning and its correctness, as well as specifying the meaning of concepts and sentences). Even if Pelc did not write about it directly, he continued a broader tradition of scientific philosophy that emerged in the late 19th and the early years of the 20th century and was a response to the speculative philosophy of past eras (especially the German and British idealists), the development of mathematical logic, and the progress of the natural sciences, in particular physics. However, like many (if not all) members of the LWS, Pelc did not share the radicalism of neo-positivists as to what the subject of philosophical reflection should be and how the problems that philosophy is supposed to deal with should be solved. Pelc unequivocally opposed being identified with positivism or neo-positivism, as well as being counted among the proponents of scientism (idem, 1999, p. 94). He declared himself as a representative of a certain kind of moderate methodological scientism (Pelc, 2008, p. 586).

As pointed out by one of Twardowski's students, Tadeusz Czeżowski, the founder of LWS implanted in his students the view that philosophical research is scientific research and should meet the requirements of scientific rigor. Formulated philosophical theses must be justified by arguments and expressed in a simple and precise form (idem, 1958a, p. 12). Izydora Dąmbska wrote that the postulate of scientific cultivation of philosophy as propagated by Twardowski and passed on to his students consisted in "specifying and, to the extent possible, solving certain philosophical issues in such a way as to – without any preconceived assumptions – provide the initial cognitive intuitions with the clearest possible discursive formulation, accessible to analysis, justification and formal criticism" (eadem, 1977, p. 1335).

[5] The minimalist formula of analytical philosophy also comes down to the fact that this philosophical movement is programmatically anti-systemic. LWS also rejected the idea of building philosophical systems and focused on solving narrowly defined problems considered philosophical using methods recognised as scientific (cf. Bocheński, 1993; Føllesdal, 1997; Nowaczyk, 2008; Szubka, 2009;). Pelc concurred with this approach. He focused on logical semiotics, philosophical logic, contemporary history of semiotics and occasionally on issues related to the methodology of the humanities; he was reluctant to address ethical issues and avoided aesthetic questions (in philosophy of art).

The approach to philosophy, and the style of practising it, that Pelc formulated can be discerned earlier, in the founder of the LWS. Following Twardowski and Kotarbiński, Pelc emphasised that philosophy is not a worldview; an academic teacher is not a priest and a university lectern is not a preacher's pulpit, and thus the approach to considering (resolving) philosophical problems must have a scientific character. Practising philosophy was to him more of a craft than an art (Pelc, 1994c, pp. 62-63). A philosophical or scientific problem must be precisely defined, and the theses should be formulated clearly (since language – as many members of the LWS agreed – is an expression of thought).[6]

An important inspiring texts that informed Pelc's position under consideration were Kotarbiński's papers entitled "The Philosopher" (Kotarbiński, 1957) and "Good work in Philosophy" (idem, 1973). Kotarbiński distinguished the role of a philosopher and a teacher of philosophy (at different levels of education). To be a good teacher of philosophy, in his view, one had to have a thorough education in the field of philosophical sciences (i.e. the historically shaped individual subdisciplines). In this sense, Pelc did not write anything new: he expressed an approach to these matters that was similar to Kotarbiński's, only stated in a more radical way than it had been done by Kotarbiński (cf. Pelc, 1999, passim; Kotarbiński, 1957, pp. 15-16).

It is worth adding that according to Kotarbiński, it was impossible to clearly demarcate research from learning and teaching, especially in philosophy (idem, 1967, p. 75). Pelc agreed with this vision of the role of a scholar and academic teacher. He, as well as many members of the LWS, considered that from the point of view of the teaching profession, including the position of an academic teacher, it was important how a teacher taught, how he wrote, and what language he used. On the other hand, "how he taught" and "how he wrote" would be reflected in the language used by the teacher (this issue will be developed separately later in this article).

Pelc distinguished the notions of a philosopher and a scientific researcher of philosophy (see idem, 1999, pp. 95-101). The latter was a specialist practising a learned profession (a specialist in his/her field of expertise) who often also worked as a teacher. Pelc treated both concepts as typological; therefore they were the ideal type of philosophy and the ideal type of a researcher of philosophy, although the boundaries of both types were not strict.[7] In Pelc's perception, a scientific researcher of philosophy dealt with what other philosophers had invented and partially (in some aspects) also with specific sciences. In other words, the subject of his/her research were philosophical concepts and some research undertakings of practitioners of specific sciences.

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[6] In the context in question, what is clear is what is obvious and understandable, or easy to understand (cf. Pelc, 2002, pp. 550-567).

[7] In terms such as "scientific researcher of philosophy", Pelc connected the adjective "scientific" with a specific profession and the way of practising it, and not with any evaluative characteristic.

What "classical philosophers" do is to reflect on reality (within the framework of individual branches of philosophy: ontology, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, etc.) and on themselves. A philosophical text is usually, like a text of literary art, metaphorical and ambiguous. Apart from that, a philosophical text often reflects the emotional charge of its author. A philosopher often prefers engaged commentary over objective information. Not maintaining a research attitude, he or she presents a description of his/her own feelings and beliefs or expresses his/her assessments in the text. According to Pelc, however, a scientific text should not express the researcher's experiences.

A scientific researcher of philosophy would analyse and criticise primarily the linguistic statements of other philosophers and some statements of representatives of specific sciences. Sometimes a scientific researcher of philosophy is an interpreter and translator of difficult or complicated texts; sometimes he puts forward hypotheses regarding their content. A scientific researcher of philosophy compares philosophical conceptions, seeks connections between them, as well as looks for the genesis of given conceptions. He formulates mainly meta-linguistic statements. He deals with the analysis of philosophical thought expressed in sentences. He translates, explains and explicates the text. He also undertakes the analysis of knowledge, i.e. acts as a theoretician of knowledge and a methodologist of sciences, and therefore analyses the concepts, statements and methodological standards of particular sciences.[8]

Pelc was adamant that the place for a philosopher was not a university or a research institute, unless he was also a scientific researcher of philosophy or a teacher of philosophy and had the qualifications to conduct research work as a scientist (Pelc, 1999, p. 100).[9]

In addition to the philosopher and the scientific researcher of philosophy, Pelc distinguished another type of activity related to the more generally understood practice of philosophy, namely, philosophical essay writing (idem, 1999, p. 105-107). Pelc wrote that philosophical essay writing was something intermediate between philosophy and its research and teaching. Philosophical essayists, in his view, were distinguished by their poetic style of writing; thinkers engaged in philosophical essay writing often used metaphor and allegory in their texts (Pelc, 1999, pp. 105-110). Yet in a scientific text, stylistic devices should play only an auxiliary role (idem, 1999, p. 113). In philosophical essay writing, works are often excessively (and in a way unjustified by substantive considerations) elaborate, with numerous repetitions and subsequent variants of the same idea. Writing

[8] Analysis is the foundation of philosophical practice. Pelc wrote directly that in philosophy, we are almost exclusively dependent on mental and linguistic ways of knowing, which is why the ability to distinguish is one of the most important attributes in the intellectual work of a philosopher (cf. Pelc, 1999, p. 93).

[9] Not all Polish analytic philosophers – and not all those from Pelc's close circle – shared the resolute and radical metaphilosophical position he represented (cf. e.g. Woleński, 1999; Nowaczyk, 2008; Szubka, 2009). Some authors were much more tolerant of non-analytical trends, such as phenomenology or existentialism (e.g. Nowak, 2000).

sarcastically about the verbosity of certain texts, Pelc pointed out that the only reason for "padding" a text, i.e. enlarging it, would be if the authors were paid per line (Pelc, 1999, p. 116). One of the peculiarities of the procedures typical of philosophical essay writing was, as he saw it, imitating the style of philosophers and citing fragments of some text or texts in one's own work. In the key passage concerning this type of essay, he wrote: "A philosophical essay has the right to exist, just as a scientific treatise or a philosophy textbook has the right to exist. Let them exist side by side. They may even, in some cases, support each other, although a philosophical essay will probably draw knowledge from a scientific treatise more often than the other way around. However, I consider it unacceptable to replace a scientific treatise or a philosophy textbook with a philosophical essay" (Pelc, 1999, p. 106).

In his considerations on the methodological model of philosophy, i.e. the ways of practising it, Pelc distinguished between "claritans" and "anti-claritans". "Anti-claritans" (Polish: *antyjasnościowcy*)[10], as Pelc called the representatives of the non-analytical philosophical tradition, often showed deficiencies in logical culture in their statements and strove to capture or reach the "philosophical depth" in their texts (Pelc, 1999, pp. 110-112).[11] According to Pelc, anti-claritans formed closed, often multi-generational social circles. Their texts were characterised by a low level of logical culture and a metaphorical style of expression. In their works, there were frequent references to the philosophical tradition of some continental thinkers (e.g. German existentialists headed by Martin Heidegger). Other phenomena encountered in their works were an avoidance of simplicity, a tendency to fall into pretentiousness, and sometimes into pathos, as well as an avoidance of giving, or making use of, specific examples to illustrate given issues, and the frequent use of abstract names.[12] Pelc also pointed out that the style of thinking, speaking and writing typical of anti-claritans occurred not only in philosophy.

By placing emphasis on the methodological aspect of philosophical investigations, Pelc highlighted the importance of the form of expression, that is, the way in which thoughts are formulated and conveyed to the recipient. According

[10] The term "claritans" refers to proponents and advocates of a clear style of expressing thoughts in speech and writing in philosophical and scientific activities.

[11] Pelc wrote, sarcastically and with a note of self-irony, that "a barbarian from the analytical school can never fathom the thought of a philosopher possessed of panache, who is impeccably incomprehensible and thus evidently wiser" (idem, 2015a, p. 27).

[12] It is worth mentioning that Pelc's position (idem, 1999) was met with sharp criticism from Barbara Skarga (eadem, 1999). She stated that he used the tone of an inquisitor and that he was, among other things, superficial and aggressive in his statements; she accused him of intending to remove from scientific institutions persons whose metaphilosophical views differed from his own. According to Skarga, Pelc's approach was supposedly motivated by an envy which many members of the LWS harbored towards philosophers who had a different view of philosophy and its style of practice. Jan Woleński came to Pelc's defense, pointing out various conceptual inconsistencies and rhetorical deficiencies in Skarga's work (Woleński, 1999).

to him, the comprehensibility and coherence of the message (scientific text) is no less crucial than its substantive content. His teacher, Kotarbiński, emphasised that the product of philosophical work should be properly developed before its publication and should not be made public in an embryonic form, i.e. as still immature and unpolished; the product given to the recipients must be ready for instructive consumption (Kotarbiński, 1967, p. 77).

The idea of pursuing philosophy, but also semiotic research, scientifically – an idea which Pelc propagated – was closely linked to the concept of scientificity that he recognised and the methodological model of the humanities that he accepted. It should be added here that for Pelc, there was no strict criterion of demarcation that would allow one to arbitrarily distinguish what was science (as a cognitive operations or product of such operations) from what was not. Pelc wrote that the word "scientific" was sometimes used (or treated) descriptively and evaluatively. When it was perceived or treated evaluatively, it referred to a gradable feature. According to Pelc, being scientific was gradable in reference to qualities; the adjectives "scientific" and "unscientific" referred to gradable features and were therefore typological terms (Pelc, 1995c, p. 8): a piece of research or a statement would be more or less scientific in such and such respects. In most cases, sets of theorems and sets of research should be ordered according to the "more scientific–less scientific" ratio than the "scientific–unscientific" one (Pelc, 1995d, p. 54; idem, 1999, pp. 94, 96).

Pelc did not write about this directly; he largely based the general notion of science and scientificity on Ajdukiewicz's considerations (cf. Ajdukiewicz, 1965b, p. 173). Science, in the sense of cognitive activity, was a set of research undertakings of a non-dogmatic nature. Inter-subjective communicability and inter-subjective verifiability of the products of epistemic operations determined their scientific status. In short, epistemic operations and their products had to comply with the requirement of anti-irrationalism. Anti-irrationalism, in Ajdukiewicz's view, came down to the precision of statements and the justification of the theses put forward; more precisely speaking, this position proclaims the "postulate of recognising only those statements that are justified in a way accessible to control" (Ajdukiewicz, 1934b, p. 399).[13] Another way of expressing it is: What determines the scientific status of cognitive activity is the formulation of questions, statements, descriptions, evaluations and conclusions in a discursive manner.

As a supporter of moderate methodological scientism, Pelc was not opposed to the use of formal methods in philosophy, including in the field of logical semiotics. He believed that they should not be fetishised and one should not fall into a mania related to the belief in the absolute superiority of these methods over the traditional analysis of natural language. In the matter of the use of formal methods in philosophy, Pelc was close to the position expressed by

[13] Pelc shared Ajdukiewicz's position, but noted that anti-irrationalism could be understood somewhat more broadly than Ajdukiewicz did (see Pelc, 2005, pp. 314-317).

Twardowski (idem, 1921; cf. Łukasiewicz, 1928; Ajdukiewicz, 1934c). Formal methods in language analysis were not, as Pelc wrote, "a miraculous means of eliminating research and nonsense. It is an auxiliary means, not a substitute. Formalisation of what we do not know does not provide any increase in knowledge" (Pelc, 1982, p. 330). According to him, the limits of using formal methods in semiotics should be set by common sense, and such means should be used when it comes to important and complicated matters. Formalisation could not be a goal, but a path leading to it (Pelc, 1982, pp. 330-331).

To move on to the already mentioned methodological model of the humanities: according to Pelc, there are two ways of practising the humanities: the scientific and the literary one.[14] The terms "scientific humanities" and "literary humanities", which Pelc wrote about directly, he used in a typological manner. In his opinion, the adjectives "scientific" and "literary" required relativisation, specifying in what respects specific works were such (Pelc, 2000b, pp. 174-175). Pelc referred to the humanities in a broad way and he included some social sciences in this group (he did not explicitly specify which social disciplines he meant, but judging from the context of his considerations it can be assumed that, e.g., both sociology and psychology were included).

The scientific humanities and literature are distinguished by types of expression. In the literary humanities, artistic means of expression are used (including metaphors, symbols, allegories and parables). Works classified as belonging to literary humanities often express the psychological experiences of their creators. The humanities study, and teach about, human experiences and actions, ideology and art. Individual scholars of the humanities differ in their abilities, interests, preferences, and the expectations of their recipients. In scientific humanities, research proceeds according to patterns found in methodologically mature sciences, using language that is free of ambiguity and not allowing any ambiguity in the implementation of research and teaching tasks. Literary humanities, in contrast, draw their methods from artistic creativity. Representatives of literary humanities want to express their own experiences and evoke experiences in their recipients, and they often do so in a vague and metaphorical way. Clear and precise formulation of thoughts is the basic duty of a humanist scholar and a humanist teacher (Pelc, 1997, p. 23).

According to Pelc, the terms "scientific" and "literary" are gradable and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between scientific humanists and literary humanists; the broad distinction is that among the operations they undertake, and the products of these activities, the scientific or the literary ones predominate, respectively. Regardless of these reservations, as part of his methodological investigations, Pelc provided a general comparative characterisation of the two types of humanities (see Table 2).

[14] Pelc briefly showed the historical connections between the humanities and the fine arts and drew attention to the scientific and artistic roots of the humanities (idem, 2000b, pp. 172-174).

Table 2

Scientific and Literary Humanities According to J. Pelc: A Comparison

	Scientific Humanities	Literary Humanities
Subject	examining experiences, human actions, ideology and art; teaching about actions and experiences; more broadly: dealing with impressions, ideas, concepts, feelings and thinking, i.e., examining acts, objects of acts and the content of these acts, dealing with activities (including thinking) and the products of these operations	the subject matter of literary humanities overlaps substantially with that of scientific humanities; differences occur in the scale of interest in a given type of research area and in the emphasis placed on specific research problems
Aims	knowing, describing and explaining reality; formulating true and objective judgments	presenting a person's own reflections, impressions, assessments and feelings; forming opinions; expressing a person's own experiences and mental states
Language	precision of linguistic statements; formulating statements free from logical flaws, which includes, among others, avoiding ambiguity	the multitude of stylistic tropes used, e.g., the extensive use of metaphorical phrases, personifications and abstract formulations; the statements are saturated with emotionality; the statements are often characterised by indelible ambiguities
Methods	guessing objects, events, occurrences, mental phenomena through the perception and interpretation of signs; interpreting and understanding these indirectly known objects, events and phenomena; describing the peculiarities or distinctiveness of given individuals or their sets; explaining, interpreting, creating	interpreting and understanding signs; producing descriptions of the peculiarities of individual objects; assessing the significance of events or phenomena; explaining events or phenomena (primarily generic and motivational-teleological ones, less often causal ones); the intraspectival approach

	types and building typologies	prevails over extraspection; intuition and empathy are also present in cognitive processes

Note. Source: based on Pelc's (2000b, pp. 175–181)

Let us now move on to matters concerning semiotics. Pelc distinguished five notions of semiotics: (1) semantic, syntactic and pragmatic properties of the sign; (2) semiotic methods (mainly the method of interpretation); we are dealing here with treating various objects, events or phenomena as signs and assigning sign functions to various events, phenomena or objects; (3) semiotics as a study of semiosis or a scientific discipline whose subject is the semiotic properties of signs; (4) theoretical semiotics operating with a semiotic meta-language of various levels (degrees), and (5) applied semiotics, e.g. semiotics of art, semiotics of culture, semiotics of politics, semiotics of religion, sociosemiotics, psychosemiotics, biosemiotics, semiotics of fashion, etc., that is, all in all, the analysis of some area of reality or sphere of life using semiotic methods (Pelc, 1982, pp. 223-227, 302-340; cf. idem, 1986; idem, 1992, pp. 23-24).[15]

Pelc understood semiotics as an interdisciplinary discipline with a wide research field. From the subject-matter perspective, he understood logical semiotics broadly, considering that it should deal not only with syntax, but with each of the other dimensions of semiosis and should include the analysis of natural language; from the methodological perspective, he took semiotics pluralistically, i.e. he accepted the admissibility of applying different research methods in this field (Pelc, 1981, pp. 240-241; see also idem, 1984, pp. 10-33, 229-234). Pelc understood a scientific discipline broadly, not only as a classification unit distinguished by the subject of study and the methods used to understand a given research area, but also as the scientific knowledge acquired through the study of that area by means of specific methods customarily assigned to a given discipline. He clearly stated that defining strict boundaries between scientific disciplines was not easy (idem, 1995a, p. 54-55). In his perception, the development of scientific research often caused further disciplinary divisions.

The broad – interdisciplinary – approach to semiotic research led Pelc to promote the concept of sciences of cognition and communication (as a family of disciplines), the institutionalisation of which was to serve the development of theoretical research on semiosis, signs and communication processes (cf. Pelc, 2015b, pp. 112-113).

At the end of this part of the analysis, it must be added that Pelc sympathised with the idea of inter- and multidisciplinary research and teaching (cf. Pelc, 1995b). He pointed out that in the cases when someone had been unsuccessful in their original discipline, they often resorted to interdisciplinary research. He also warned against becoming a harmful dilettante in the field of interdisciplinary

[15] The high level of applied semiotics is determined by the high level of theoretical semiotics (cf. Pelc, 1984, pp. 346-347; idem, 2015b, p. 112).

research.[16] At the same time, he advocated adherence to the methodological standards of the parent (superior) disciplines on which the research was based. In his opinion, appropriate competences and erudition were necessary in order for a person to be able to engage in interdisciplinary research and teaching. As he saw it, combining research projects within given disciplines required demonstrating both proper knowledge of the given disciplines and command of appropriate cognitive operations in specific disciplines in force (cf. Pelc, 1995a, pp. 57-58).

Pelc shared the view that the future of science largely belonged to this kind of research. He also pointed out certain difficulties and dangers inherent in the situations when the assessors look at a given problem from a narrow perspective related to (or combined with) their own scientific discipline. The overlap of research subjects between individual scientific disciplines poses a problem in the just evaluation of interdisciplinary research (cf. Pelc, 1995c, p. 9). For example, if a work concerned issues in the field of biophysics and the assessors were a biologist and a physicist, and each of them looked at the problem from a narrow angle (that is, one limited to the discipline they represent) and not holistically, neither of them would see anything innovative or interesting in the assessed work. Each of them would see only and exclusively trees of species known to him or her; but neither would be able to see the forest as a whole.

4. Research Attitude and Scientific Evaluation Criteria

To be worthy of the name of "scholar", one must have given intellectual predispositions and act in a certain way when conducting cognitive operations. One of the fundamental features that, according to Pelc, must distinguish the research attitude is cognitive curiosity and critical thinking. Pelc highlighted the importance of being open to new issues and speaking competently within the research field in which a given scholar specialises (i.e. the field which is the main domain of his or her research interests).

This eminent scholar warned against following fashions in science. In his opinion, what was fashionable did not necessarily have to be cognitively or methodologically valuable; it was not appropriate to succumb to fashionable research trends and unknowingly follow the group that set or promoted these trends. In short: hasty or thoughtless adherence to fashionable concepts or research techniques can lead a scientist astray, causing a wastage of time, effort and resources, both on the part of this scientist and often on the part of his or her recipients as well.

It is the scientist's duty to familiarise himself with the research tradition of his own scientific discipline, including his native achievements (i.e. those originating from his own country). Pelc stressed the need to avoid the erudition falla-

[16] Words such as "social harm" and "harmful action" appeared many times in reference to unacceptable practices in the scientific community. By using them, Pelc probably wanted to strongly emphasise the negative effects of a given type of activities.

cy (Polish: *błąd erudycyjny*), which consists in not being familiar with the main research works belonging to a given branch of knowledge or scientific discipline. In research work, he stated, one should first rely on primary source texts; if possible and justified by the research purpose, first editions (i.e. the oldest print of given work) should be used. Such remarks were strongly formulated by him during seminars with students of higher years of studies.

A scientist's own (personal) criticism, i.e. autocriticism, and criticism directed at the work of other scientists, the so-called allocriticism, are necessary for conducting scientific activity as a set of cognitive operations. Pelc distinguished criticism as an activity (operation) and as a product (result). He stated that criticism was a feature of the way of thinking. Critical thinking was accompanied by a variety of intellectual, practical and moral properties, among which he included an anti-dogmatic approach, scepticism, inquisitiveness, detachment, perceptiveness, insightfulness, meticulousness, diligence, fairness in assessments, and courage. Their opposites (as negative properties) did not characterise critical thinking (Pelc, 1998, p. 17). He wrote: "A critical attitude in science and critical thinking in science mean that one does not accept [anything] as true or right without due justification, nor does one state what common sense advises or requires to be justified, but is opposed to the view that obliges one to accept as true certain statements regardless of whether they have been sufficiently justified" (idem, 1998, p. 17).

Pelc presented a comprehensive approach to critical thinking in science. Within the critical attitude towards scientific activities, he indicated the following stages: critical attitude towards research problems, critical attitude towards research methods, criticism in the course of solving research problems (with a distinction made between the specifics of given fields of science and scientific disciplines, e.g. as in the case of formal sciences, strict natural sciences, humanities and social sciences, etc.), criticism (autocriticism) in formulating research results (also while maintaining the differences characteristic of given fields of science), criticism towards the scientific product (autocriticism and allocriticism) and towards the language of the scientific text (autocriticism and allocriticism), criticism in the procedures of checking knowledge (indicating those comprehensible sentences that the critic is ready to recognise as true, and from those recognised as true, distinguishing those considered valuable by him), and finally criticism towards the justification of sentences, i.e. in relation to entire inferences – a system of premises leading to specific conclusions (Pelc, 1998, pp. 18-23).

Criticism across the scientific community is not only significant, it is crucial to science. Pelc points to its fourfold role, namely: selective, advisory, informative and heuristic (see idem, 1998, p. 15). Writing about criticism in science, Pelc distinguished: (a) criticism of research procedures, hypotheses, scientific claims and their justifications, located in a field outside science, such as the organisation of science, science policy, ethics, etc.; (b) criticism located within science, but concerning everyday matters outside science, such as works of art, customs, human or animal behaviour, etc.; such criticism takes place at the core of proce-

dures considered scientific (it meets the condition of scientificity); (c) criticism in the case of which the act of criticising and its product belong to science; Pelc gave here the example of research articles in experimental sciences (idem, 1998, pp. 7-8).[17]

In criticism considered scientific, the assessment expressing the attitude to given activities or their products must be formulated inter-subjectively and in accordance with the recommendation *sine ira et studio*; a critic should be fair and impartial, but also demanding and uncompromising (Pelc, 1998, p. 10, 24). It should be added here that among the members of the LWS, a relatively similar position was expressed by, e.g., Czeżowski in his work devoted to reliability, objectivity and impartiality in scientific research (idem, 1958a), which was known to Pelc.

Pelc stressed that scientific criticism and scientific evaluation should serve social goals and the scientific community (idem 1996a, p. 119); concurrently he asserted that conniving in such evaluations and lowering the requirements for scientific promotions constituted a form of social damage. He also noted that the evaluation of scientific works was always doomed to subjectivity and inadequacy (idem, 1996a, p. 115).

Pelc advocated an elitist approach to pursuing science. He accepted traditional academic hierarchies and the connection between taking up official positions at the university and formal requirements for obtaining subsequent academic degrees (Pelc, 1995c, p. 9). Academic positions, degrees and functions ought to be assigned to each other (idem, 1995c, p. 14; idem, 1995d, pp. 45; 59-65). Pelc often stressed that hierarchies in the academic environment should be shaped analogously to the ranks existing in the military.

Pelc generally placed an emphasis on the quality in the assessment of scientific works and in the assessment of the scientific achievements of scientists, where the key qualifications were, for him, the scientific ones, then the teaching qualifications, and finally the organisational ones, i.e. those related to organising research and teaching (1995c, p. 7). The most important were the actual research achievements, which could be replaced in the assessment by teaching and organisational achievements (idem, 1995c, p. 10). According to Pelc, in scientific evaluation the crucial cognitive values were, first, novelty and inventiveness in relation to the current state of knowledge, and secondly, methodological correctness of a given research work. He also added that the detailed criteria for scientific evaluation (i.e., certain aspects of the evaluation and their validity) may vary across different fields of science and even individual scientific disciplines (Pelc, 1996a, p. 110).

Pelc highlighted the role of the obligation placed on scientists to review works on issues that are well known to them. He believed that a scientist cannot

[17] Pelc also distinguished between criticism in which evaluation activities are conducted within a given scientific discipline and those performed from the perspective of another scientific discipline (see Pelc, 1998, pp. 14-15).

refuse to undertake this task; in other words, a scholar cannot refuse to write a review if he or she is competent in a given subject (Pelc, 1996a, pp. 115-116). Pelc advocated for transparency and integrity in scientific evaluation procedures. He emphasised the need to distance reviewers from the centre (place and institution) in which the person they evaluate is employed (Pelc, 1998, p. 25).

The abundance of scientific achievements was, in his view, not an advantage at all; it is, after all, easier to count the number of publications and their pages than to assess the value of these publications (Pelc, 1999, p. 115). Pelc mentioned – in the context of the scientific evaluation of an individual scholar's achievements – that he had formulated a rule (belonging to "academic optics") which he actually called "Pelc's law". It stated that the closer the scholar's achievements were to the observers, the smaller they were (Pelc, 2008, p. 587); in other words, the more closely we begin to look at someone's scientific achievements, the more flaws or shortcomings we find in them (this statement was formulated in connection with Pelc's experience of working in review boards).

5. Teaching and Language

Pelc regarded himself as an academic teacher (idem, 2008, p. 586). More precisely, he considered himself a teacher of "a section (fragment), i.e. of a specific branch of philosophy" (idem 2010b, pp. 37-38). He expressly said that he wished to be identified as a teacher of good thinking and speaking. In the role of a teacher of the broadly understood logic, he set himself a task of teaching his charges to speak and write clearly and correctly. In his teaching and educational work, he emphasised the role of the teacher in shaping the "material not yet developed", i.e. influencing young people (first-year students) in this area; he treated his endeavor as a continuation of the path marked out by Twardowski (Pelc, 2008, p. 589). Pelc admitted (stating his views *expressis verbis*), that in his teaching and writing work he was particularly keen to encourage people to be critical, to make independent assessments, to express their thoughts precisely and to properly justify their judgments (Pelc, 2008, p. 587).

Pelc made several direct references to his teachers, emphasising their influence on his individual scientific development. He devoted considerable attention to his university teachers, a group that included Kotarbiński, Ajdukiewicz, Jan Doroszewski and Władysław Tatarkiewicz (cf. Pelc 1987a; idem, 1987b). Pelc stressed that he had had wonderful teachers (idem, 2015a, p. 27). He wrote that he considered himself a disciple and successor of Kotarbiński, Tatarkiewicz and Ajdukiewicz (Pelc, 2015a, p. 23). When writing about his teachers, he underscored the role of authority in science and simultaneously highlighted the importance of attitudes adopted by scholars in the academic environment on the one hand, and the significant didactic influence of research patterns for entrants of given scientific disciplines on the other. Pelc mentioned, in particular, Kotarbiński and Tatarkiewicz, with whom he was associated from the very begin-

ning of his philosophical studies, saying that they had been, and still were, both great and close to him (Pelc, 1994d, pp. 384-385). "I had great teachers", he wrote (Pelc, 1994b, p. 7), adding that some of those outstanding scientists treated him as a friend (Pelc, 1994b, p. 7). He considered his teachers to have been ideal role models: paragons of moral conduct, of hard, solid and reliable work, and of disciplined thought and action. The attitudes they displayed and the positions they held, he said, shaped him intellectually (Pelc, 1994c, p. 68). He regarded Kotarbiński and Ajdukiewicz as his mentors and treated them as intellectual and moral guides (Pelc, 2008, pp. 572-573).

In fact, numerous luminaries from the LWS expressed similar views on the role of teachers as role models. Kotarbiński wrote that a personal example of scientific and didactic work is a pattern for others, as an illustration giving the figures of his teacher Twardowski and colleague Stanisław Leśniewski, as well as Leon Petrażycki, Jan Łukasiewicz, Ajdukiewicz, Władysław Witwicki and the naturalist Antoni Bolesław Dobrowolski (Kotarbiński, 1967, pp. 76-83). Negative behaviours and reprehensible attitudes were presented as anti-patterns (cf. ibidem, pp. 83-84). Czeżowski wrote in a similar manner about Twardowski's influence on students. Czeżowski recalled that Twardowski, who had been his teacher, set his own example of teaching work and established a certain program of academic teaching in relation to the way of conducting lectures, seminars or exercises and conducting classes within a scientific club intended for students (Czeżowski, 1958b, p. 13).

According to Pelc, the role of the teacher was first and foremost to help the students to unlearn bad habits (idem, 1999, p. 109). The point of the teacher's activity was to prevent incorrect habits and practices or stylistic manners already exhibited by students from becoming ingrained. The educator and mentor should indicate the pupils' mistakes and show them the way to correct these mistakes; he should also show them the proper behaviours (Pelc, 2000a, p. 9).[18] It was not the teacher's task to convey his or her own private matters *ex cathedra*. Pelc emphasised that an academic teacher should be a guide and a mentor, not a despot. The right approach was to teach good patterns by means of, among others, giving correct examples, since examples are an integral part of the teaching process; discussing new, unfamiliar or complex topics required illustrative use of appropriate examples. Pelc's emphasis on the importance of providing examples was reflected in his proofreading of his students' essays, which he read carefully and insightfully, and on which he added his own handwritten notes and comments; he always noticed and pointed out the absence of examples in a student's paper.

[18] It should be added that Pelc believed that correctness and incorrectness should be treated as gradable features ("correct" and "incorrect" being, according to him, gradable adjectives). He emphasised that a given action or its product would be more or less correct or more or less incorrect in such and such respect and in view of this and that. Therefore, there would be a need to specify what the evaluation concerns and in view of what purpose this and that is correct or incorrect (Pelc, 2002, pp. 100-101).

It must be mentioned here that Pelc presented an elitist approach not only to practising science, but also to studying. He criticised the "sweet academic life" and the associated lowering of the level of education at Polish universities and the lowering of requirements for students (Pelc, 2015a, p. 29). He was also critical of the lowering of study standards and requirements for obtaining university diplomas after 1989 (Pelc 2004, p. 6-7). He advocated a traditional approach to education processes. He put emphasis on the role of encyclopaedic knowledge in education, as it provides a general overview of matters and gives one the ability to compare and evaluate things (Pelc, 2008, p. 589).

In order to teach anyone anything, a teacher (not only of philosophy) must be understandable (cf. Twardowski, 2023b, passim; Kotarbiński, 1949; idem, 1973). In Pelc's view, this was a necessary but not a sufficient condition: he maintained that it is only when students truly understand (and not only feel that they understand) their teacher that they can learn or unlearn something from him or her (idem, 2010b, p. 37).[19]

Pelc made an emphatic distinction between the sense (feeling) of understanding a given utterance and truly (correctly) understanding it (idem, 2010b, p. 39). Yet moving from the feeling of understanding to understanding was not an easy process. Pelc provided three basic ways of proving whether someone or something, for instance a statement, has been understood: (1) providing specific examples for it; (2) providing a translation of this statement into other ethnic languages or providing several variants of the translation (paraphrase) within the language in which the statement was formulated; (3) providing a dozen or so logical consequences of the given sentence (idem, 2010b, p. 39).

According to Pelc, the sense of understanding someone or something was a subjective state *par excellence* (idem, 2010b, p. 41). This state was, in his view, similar to faith; but it was faith in one's own intellect or intuition and not in some external entity. This feeling was given to people to an unequal degree and depended on individual certainty, the strength of their belief in their own insight and high interpretive potential (not, for example, on knowledge or intelligence). Approaching understanding depended on knowledge; according to Pelc, the more a person knew, the easier it was for him or her to understand something and the deeper their understanding; also, the faster he or she would realise that they do not understand something and probably would not understand it. A sense of understanding without understanding promoted irrational attitudes and actions (idem, 2010b, p. 41). Criticism and restraint in accepting concepts, statements or views was a good starting point for beginning to interpret things (ibidem, p. 42).

The intelligibility of statements in communication processes was crucial to the intellectual formation with which Pelc felt connected. He adamantly believed that the requirement of comprehensibility of statements was important not only

[19] This view of teaching was complemented by Ajdukiewicz, who wrote that in order to be a good teacher, one must not only master the practice, but also be thoroughly conversant with the theory (idem, 1934a, p. 5).

in scientific texts intended for scholars, i.e. specialists, but also for didactic and educational reasons in texts intended for a wider audience (Pelc, 2000b, p. 203). In line with his pedagogical message that one of the key tasks of a teacher was to help the students to unlearn their bad habits, he pointed out practices that should not, or actually must not, be tolerated in scientific and publishing activities.

Pelc emphasised the need to adapt the form and content of one's statements to the given audience, pace and time. In other words, the statement (both spoken and written) must always be adapted to the recipient and the linguistic and extra-linguistic context. Moreover, Pelc stated that one should try to correct and clarify vague statements. He recommended avoiding intricacies when explaining specific issues to someone and not overcomplicating issues that could be presented (or explained) clearly and simply. A scholarly style – one for show – contributed nothing to the fundamental goal that the publication was supposed to achieve, which was to familiarise recipients with specific issues (cf. Pelc, 1984, p. 7). Pelc also instructed not to write *ab ovo* in scientific texts, that is to follow the rule: "Do not write everything you know, but only what is needed in a given passage of your statement to convey the essential information".

Pelc wrote that language was a mirror in which the epoch and culture of the people speaking it were faithfully reflected (idem, 2000c, p. 339).[20] Vague statements are similar to mass-market goods that sell well because they are attractive and cheap (ibidem, p. 343): they are easy to produce, do not require much effort, solid professional knowledge or preparation on the part of the sender of the message (ibidem). Pelc wrote expressly that an intentional ambiguity introduced into a scientific text with the intention of masking the author's lack of knowledge and his or her intellectual emptiness was a fraud (idem, 2000c, p. 344). Negligence, clumsiness or linguistic bungling, as well as the use of ambiguous expressions or notions that the author did not understand, were, according to Pelc, external manifestations of a disrespectful attitude towards the mental task being performed, as well as a manifestation of insufficient intellectual discipline and sloppy thinking (Pelc, 2000a, pp. 8-9).[21] A clear text enables the reader to reach into the depth of the studied area; someone who thinks clearly will notice more objects, grasp more features of things, distinguish objects better, and notice more connections between them (Pelc, 2002, p. 567).

It is no coincidence that when writing about the need to use a clear message, Pelc quoted pertinent rhymed aphorisms by Tadeusz Kotarbiński, such as the one

[20] Pelc devoted several separate publications to issues related to linguistic correctness and the appropriate style of scientific statements, including the editing of the collective work "The Language of Contemporary Humanities" published in 2000 as part of the LST series. His own statements were unparalleled examples of the culture of speech and clarity of message, and he expected the same from other authors.

[21] Pelc shared the recommendations of John Locke not to waste time reading works whose authors did not take proper care of *how* they wrote, i.e. they did not care about the choice of words and the construction of sentences in order to reach the target readers with their thoughts (cf. Pelc, 2000b, p. 171).

about a herring and a catfish or about understanding something incomprehensible as a peculiar health condition (cf. e.g. Pelc, 2000c, p. 341; idem, Pelc, 2010b, p. 37; Kotarbiński, 1966, pp. 25, 146).[22] What Kotarbiński expressed with the help of a rhyming verse, Pelc formulated directly, without beating around the bush, and showed how things were, in black and white, always with adequate examples and often with a longer or shorter commentary.

Pelc recommended avoiding reading works that were "collages" (i.e. texts composed of other people's conceptions), or in other words, works whose authors compiled and processed other people's thoughts, which ultimately created non-inventive conceptions (Pelc, 2015a, p. 6).

An excessively elevated style of expression, an avoidance of simplicity and taking recourse to metaphor were, in Pelc's opinion, examples of inappropriate practices encountered in contemporary texts by representatives of the humanities and social sciences. He saw nothing wrong in using metaphors and abstract wordings; a metaphor could cause misunderstandings and complicate the verification of a scientific text, but it could also be a helpful teaching tool that facilitates the consolidation of a given message (Pelc, 1998, pp. 21-22; cf. idem 2019). Using metaphors in scientific texts, however, required supplementing given fragments of discourse with their literal equivalents. In other words, Pelc maintained that metaphors are useful – also in scientific texts – but they cannot be left without appropriate clarifications, and the explication of a metaphorical phrase should include a literal paraphrase of the metaphor (Pelc, 2000b, pp. 187-189). In scientific texts, however, a metaphor should play at most an auxiliary or illustrative role due to the difficulty of replacing metaphorical formulations with literal sentences; this is because unspecified statements allow for more than one

[22] The dispute about the style and manner of conducting philosophical considerations is well illustrated by the pre-war discussion conducted by Twardowski and Roman Ingarden; it was also a dispute about the limits of the necessary clarification of given types of statements. This discussion was also joined by Joachim Metallman (idem, 1919) and David Einhorn (idem, 1919). Twardowski's basic thesis boiled down to the statement that he who writes unclearly, thinks unclearly (idem, 1919). Ingarden took the position that intuition can sometimes be expressed unclearly, i.e., imprecisely, especially when it concerns preliminary or working versions of an idea (idem, 1919). A middle position in this dispute was taken by Tadeusz Czeżowski; he defended, among others, the view that texts should be distinguished in terms of the purpose for which they were prepared. The incomprehensibility of language could lie in the recipient's ignorance of a given terminology or the recipient's ignorance of certain facts, and therefore the sender was not always responsible for the ambiguity of the statement (Czeżowski, 1958c, pp. 290-291). Twardowski suggested that a discussion with someone who writes unclearly (and probably therefore thinks unclearly) should not be entered into. Czeżowski, on the other hand, indicated that sometimes one should stand in opposition to someone who propagates unclear theses. At the same time, Czeżowski pointed out that unclear thoughts sometimes needed to be corrected or opposed so that they did not become widespread (idem, 1958c, p. 293); constructive (caring) criticism could contribute to the correction of unclear texts (ibidem, p. 293).

interpretation. Pelc saw this as particularly important in the case of crucial statements and final conclusions (ibidem, pp. 200-204). Multi-level metaphors and abstract wordings without foundations, he said, create fog in the minds of the recipients (ibidem, p. 204; see also idem, 1971a, pp. 164-196). The absence of paraphrases of metaphorical expressions can lead to various misunderstandings. Pelc emphasised that certain metaphorical expressions could not be freed from their figurative features. All in all, there was nothing reprehensible in using metaphors as long as one did not stop at them (Pelc, 1997, p. 26; idem, 2000b, pp. 187-189, 198-201).

6. Organisational and Institutional Issues

In performing important organisational functions in academic structures, Pelc, like his teachers and the teacher of his teachers,[23] referred to the existing institutional processes related to scientific activity, as well as to the state and the conditions of practising science in Poland. The extensive experience gained while performing such functions allowed Pelc to formulate critical remarks and recommendations in relation to the areas in question. Similarly to his teachers, he was obliged to take a stand in the public debate on specific issues; they did this not only because of their rank in the academic community, but also because of their sense of responsibility for the development of science in the country.

Pelc criticised some of the pathologies that appeared in science and higher education after the systemic transformation, such as taking up multiple jobs (multi-tenure employment), commercialisation of scientific activity, excessive bureaucratisation of science, or plagiarisms in the written output. He formulated most of these critical remarks during the educational boom in higher education in Poland in the 1990s (this applies in particular to situations occurring with the advent of radical social change after 1989). He also referred to the current reforms of science and higher education, doing it in a way that was critical and at the same time constructive. He proposed certain corrections in that matter, as well as suggested specific institutional and legal changes (Pelc, 1995d, p. 52). Similarly, criticising the pathologies observed in the scientific community, he proposed introducing specific institutional and legal changes for remedial purposes (idem, 2001b, pp. 130-131). He formulated diagnoses and prescribed remedies. His institutional remarks and recommendations were based on his direct observations and organisational experiences. These remarks were accompanied

[23] Members of the LWS formulated various recommendations regarding academic activities and developed curricula, mainly in the field of philosophy, including logic (cf. Twardowski, 2023b; Ajdukiewicz, 1955a; idem, 1955b; idem, 1959; Kotarbiński, 1915; idem, 1918; idem, 1967). In the conditions of the People's Republic of Poland, the implementation of some of the postulates that were close to the LWS and related to the functioning of higher education institutions and education in philosophy and other humanities was not possible (cf. Jadczak, 1991).

by reflections of a more general nature and specific observations concerning specific practical issues (cf. Pelc, 1996b; idem, 2009, pp. 27-31, 50-58).

Among the many pathologies observed in the academic environment, he considered holding multiple jobs[24] as one of the most seriously negative phenomena of this type to exist in scientific life (Pelc, 2001b, p. 128). He mockingly called scientists working multiple jobs *korabielnikowcy*, the name coined in reference to the Soviet work leader Lydia Korabelnikova, a Stakhanovite who allegedly worked overtime and operated several looms simultaneously (Pelc 2006, p. 171).[25] Such conduct (related to the commercialisation of scientific work) comes at the cost of a significant decline in the quality of research and teaching. Pelc listed a whole list of negative consequences of conduct under consideration. Referring to examples, he pointed out that on a personal level, having multiple jobs reduces the quantity and quality of scientific work, contributes to the lack of time for scientific work and for leisure, limits the time available for students; also, on an institutional level, it weakens scientific institutions, undermines scientific ethos, lowers the morale of subordinates, weakens teamwork. Having multiple jobs clashes with loyalty to the institutions in which one works, violates the impartiality of scientists and is associated with a loss of trust in the scientific community (1995b, pp. 176-183; Pelc, 2001b, pp. 128-130).

The pursuit of independent academic staff (associate professors and full professors) was detrimental to the quality of education (in that period, an intensive process of hiring professors was underway in order for an institution to obtain or increase the authority to award academic degrees). According to Pelc, universities were de facto becoming companies selling diplomas for minimal requirements while maximising profits (idem, 2010c, p. 9).

It is significant that when Pelc founded the Department of Logical Semiotics at the University of Warsaw (probably the first such institution in the world) and launched "Studia Semiotyczne" (which at that time was a non-periodical publication), he shared his observations and practical advice regarding the future organisation of semiotics departments in research institutions. In the early 1970s, he presented an outline of a program encompassing the expansion of semiotics facilities (departments and laboratories), with theoretical and applied research as the basis for this expansion (see Pelc, 1973, pp. 17-19).

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[24] In Pelc's perception, "multiple jobs" were any additional, non-casual paid jobs (Pelc, 2001b, p. 128). He understood multiple jobs broadly, as he meant "not only holding more than one job, but also more than one paid job of a scientist, especially an academic teacher, performed on any formal basis, e.g. on the basis of a contract, a contract for specific work, etc." (Pelc, 2006, p. 171). He did not include writing scientific books, textbooks, reviews or translations in this category (ibidem).

[25] In reality, the figure of Korabelnikova had been mythologised. The actual worker, i.e. the historical figure, is occasionally identified with two different persons: a Soviet woman working in a shoe-making factory and a Romanian woman employed in a textile factory. The crux of her achievement was not overtime work, but efficiency in making use of available materials.

In the last volume of "Studia Semiotyczne" that he edited, Pelc included a list of editorial tips and advice for future editors of the journal (Pelc, 2015a, pp. 27-30). Apart from the issues related to the care for, above all, the quality of scientific texts published in the journal, he wrote, among others, that "Studia Semiotyczne" and books published in the series Library of Semiotic Thought should be published in both paper and electronic versions; he suggested seeking grants rather than scholarships to finance the journal; he also appealed for maintaining cooperation between representatives of cognitive and communication sciences, the Polish Semiotic Society and the Department of Logical Semiotics of the University of Warsaw.

In this farewell text, Pelc expressed a critical attitude towards the official point system for assessing scientific journals (idem, 2015a, p. 6). As he noted, editorial committees and boards, which could determine the prestige of scientific journals, were generally ornamental in nature (ibidem, p. 14). He wrote that with this system, the numerical measure had become preponderant over the measure of the quality of scientific research, which, in his opinion, was particularly harmful to the humanities (ibidem, p. 6). In his view, the points awarded to journals had become the currency in which authors who published their texts in them were paid (ibidem, p. 9).

It is worth mentioning that in private conversations, Pelc willingly shared advice and tips on how to deal with the organisational and bureaucratic structures of the academic world. For instance, he recommended that in the case of administrative suggestions, one should listen to the official instructions. In other words, if an official suggests something to us, that suggestion is worth complying with for practical reasons; when we find ourselves face to face with the bureaucratic machine and encounter an insuperable barrier therein, we should let go and not waste our strength and time on insurmountable limitations.

7. Overall Summary

Based on the main (fundamental) normative sentences, it is possible to reconstruct a certain set of elementary principles that are specific (of a certain kind) commandments appropriate to the approach represented by many analytic philosophers, not only by Jerzy Pelc and his philosophy teachers. An octalogue of commandments which can be constructed in this way may be represented as follows:

You shall be inquisitive

You shall be critical of yourself and other cognitive subjects.

You shall not write ab ovo.

You shall not use obscure language.

You shall try to clarify vague statements.

You shall not overuse metaphors in scientific text.

You shall reach for the primary source and you shall not use second- or third-hand works.

You shall use examples to explain things that are new, little known, or difficult.

This octalogue is a set of paraphrases of some normative statements and expresses the fundamental, cardinal rules of conduct (this refers to the conduct of scientists, philosophers cultivating the idea of scientific philosophy and teachers of philosophy). This set of sentences instructs what must be done and what must not be done. What counts here is the categorical nature of the sentence and the importance of the issue it concerns. It might be said that such a set of recommendations is a *sui generis* metaphilosophical decalogue; but the sentences in question have a different semiotic status and perform distinct communicative functions. As eight metaphilosophical commandments from the analytical point of view, this octalogue covers cardinal principles and is the *crème de la crème* of the meta-philosophical position under consideration. It should be added that these rules constitute a guarantee of inter-subjective communicability and provide the basis for the inter-subjective verifiability of a scientific text.

When the key theses, norms, recommendations and advice relating to the problem areas defining the metaphilosophical and metascientific position of Jerzy Pelc are collected, they can be presented together in the table below (see Table 3).

Table 3

The Content of Jerzy Pelc's Metaphilosophical and Metascientific Position. Selected Examples of Key Statements, Norms and Recommendations

Domain	*Theses* (*statements*)	*Norms and methodological standards*	*Recommendations, suggestions, wishes*	*Valuations and assessments*
A. Methodological status of philosophy and the humanities	Philosophy is a kind of cognitive activity. As a cognitive activity,	In philosophy, one must formulate clear and well-argued theses. Philosophical	Do not abuse formal methods in philosophy when this is to bring only spectacular and at the same time apparent	Philosophical essay-writing is not philosophy, but a literary endeavour.

	philosophy is subject to the same evaluation criteria as any scientific activity. In academic practice, dealing with and teaching philosophy takes two forms: scientific and essayistic. There is no universal criterion for demarcation. As features of epistemic operations and their products "scientific" and "non-scientific" are gradable. Science is a cognitive activity of a non-dogmatic nature.	works are subject to general criteria for assessing scientific activity. It is not quantity but quality that determines the value of scientific achievements. Products of epistemic operations considered scientific must meet the condition of anti-irrationality.	results. There is no place in academic structures for philosophers who are essayists.	Quantitative assessments (of scientific activity and products of epistemic operations) are easier, while qualitative (although subjective) assessments are more important.
B. Research attitude		Be inquisitive. You shall be critical of yourself and	Learn the research tradition of your own scientific discipline.	Not everything that is fashionable is valuable in science.

		your scientific work. Practise internal and external criticism (i.e. autocriticism and allocriticism).	Do not be guided by fashion in scientific activity. Be open to new issues, but speak or write competently within your research field of specialisation.	
C. Conversational practices in social sciences and humanities and use of scientific language		Express yourself precisely. Imprecise statements should be made more precise. Do not write everything you know, but only what is needed in a given fragment of your statement to convey the essential information. If you use a metaphor in scientific text, supplement your statement with adequate literal formulations. Rely on source texts. Do not use	You should adapt the form of your statement (written text) to the place (non-linguistic context) to and your receiver. The style of the message should be adapted to the tasks of the message it is to serve. When you present new, little-known or difficult (complicated) issues, illustrate your statements with examples. Avoid the erudition fallacy.	

		second- or third-hand works.		
D. Teaching (at university level)		It is not the teacher's task to convey his or her own private matters *ex cathedra*. A university teacher should help the students to unlearn their bad habits. You shall clearly formulate your thoughts in speech and writing.	An academic teacher should be a guide and a mentor, not a despot.	
E. Institutional and organisational issues				When you undertake multiple jobs, you run into a conflict of interests and fail to properly fulfil your responsibilities at each of these jobs.

8. Final Remarks

Professor Jerzy Pelc continued the style of practising philosophy which was characteristic of the LWS and popularised the scientific achievements of this

school in his publications, organisational activities and teaching. Some of his approaches and positions (in particular, his views on the role of philosophy and the acceptable way of practising it, as well as requirements regarding the desirable features of the language of the humanities, including the postulate of cultivating logical culture and ensuring clarity of expression) were a direct continuation of the ideas expressed by Twardowski, Kotarbiński or Ajdukiewicz.

Pelc, like many practitioners of analytic philosophy, including the coryphaei of the LWS, supported the idea of scientific philosophy. When this approach is taken into account, being a good philosopher is equivalent to being a good scholar in one's profession. (It must be noted that the characteristics related to the description of the philosopher's profession as presented by Pelc were largely taken from Kotarbiński; also, Pelc's notions of what science was, and what criteria determined the scientific nature of cognitive activity, were to a significant extent based on Ajdukiewicz's investigations). So, all in all, what does being a good philosopher – as stated in the title of this article – entail? Being a good philosopher (including a logical semiotician) means being a scholar who demonstrates a specific research attitude and adheres to the methodological standards appropriate to the scientific humanities.

Finally, let it be mentioned that although Pelc embodied the analytical approach to practising philosophy characteristic of the LWS, he took a more assertive approach than many of its members when it came to the methodological requirements placed on philosophers; in this respect he was closer to Ajdukiewicz than to Kotarbiński or Czeżowski. Pelc's metaphilosophical position was firm, expressive and fundamental, but it was not absolutist.

On the other hand, Pelc, continuing the tradition of the LWS and popularising its heritage, sometimes went beyond the issues which the members of this school had dealt with; for example, he was interested in the problem of inter- and transdisciplinary research (whereas in the times of Twardowski, Łukasiewicz, Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbiński and Czeżowski the institutional and organisational development of scientific activity was not as advanced as, for instance, in the last decade of the 20th century).

Pelc dealt with some of the metaphilosophical and metascientific issues more frequently (e.g. compliance with specific requirements for conducting research), and some he addressed less frequently (e.g. issues related to the institutional and organisational aspect of scientific activity). Like Ajdukiewicz, Czeżowski and Kotarbiński, as well as Twardowski before them, Pelc also held important organisational and official positions, which meant that certain problematic threads or more detailed issues directly related to scientific work and its results appeared in his publications to a greater extent. To some issues, such as the language of scientific statements or the requirements for research work and achievements related to scientific advancement, he returned many times. In his field of interest (among others, the metascientific questions) were the institutional and organisational processes of creating scientific knowledge. Pelc was interested in both the descriptive and normative aspects of this issue. He devoted many critical re-

marks to improper customs and counterproductive legal regulations concerning the formal side of financing and evaluating research work. Given his interest in the philosophy of language, these issues were taken up by him only as a sideline. The numerous observations related to the practice of scientific activity, the organisation of research work, and the evaluation of scientific research, made by Pelc over the many years when he was performing various functions in scientific institutions, are in themselves interesting research material – not only (or even primarily) for philosophers of science, but for psychologists of science and sociologists of science.

Each of the leading representatives of the individual generations of Polish analytic philosophy left a distinct mark and had a noticeable influence on their successors. In retrospect, it can be said that Kazimierz Twardowski's didactic thought, including the style of his scientific, organisational and didactic work, did not become just a distant echo, but translated into a real and constantly resonating, creative voice of his students and students of these students. Similarly, Pelc's scientific, organisational (including editorial) and teaching activities are continued by a group of his younger colleagues, co-workers and students. The relay continues.

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