A r t i c l e

MACIEJ TARNOWSKI *

PROPER NAMES AS DEMONSTRATIVES IN FICTION

S U M M A R Y : In this article, I argue for two theses. The first is that, among different existing accounts of proper name semantics, indexicalism—a stance that treats proper names as indexical expressions—is best suited to explaining various phenomena exhibited by the use of proper names in fictional discourse. I will discuss these phenomena and compare the solutions offered by traditional descriptivist and causal-historical theories of proper name reference with those proposed by indexicalists. Subsequently, I will offer a novel account of indexicalism about proper names, which uses the apparatus of so-called hybrid expressions (Ciecierski, 2020; Künne, 1992; Predelli, 2006) as an alternative to traditional Kaplanian semantics for demonstratives. I offer an argument explaining why, among the variety of indexical views, one should favour such a hybrid theory over other available ones (e.g., Pelczar, Rainsbury, 1998; Rami, 2014) based on the analysis of "distributed utterances" (McCullagh, 2020) and statements that employ more than one fictional context.

K E Y W O R D S : fiction, reference, proper names, indexicals, demonstratives, hybrid expressions.

1. Introduction

David Kaplan reportedly complained that "proper names were a nightmare for semantics, and if it were not for their use in calling the kids for dinner, he would as soon junk the whole category" (Korta, Perry, 2011, p. 74). Among these "nightmarish" properties of proper names, one obviously should point to their

* University of Warsaw, Faculty of Philosophy. E-mail: m.tarnowski3@student.uw. edu.pl. ORCID: 0000-0003-3824-4134.

widespread use in fictional discourse; all of the most popular approaches to proper name semantics—causal-chain theory, descriptivism, and predicativism—have significant trouble providing an intuitive description of the functioning of proper names in fiction. The mere variety of different uses of fictional names—fictional, parafictional, metafictional, or existential—seems to demand different referents across these uses: fictional characters, abstract objects, or no referents at all. Therefore, the mainstream semantic theories that take proper names to be uniformly referring across these uses face serious difficulties in accounting for the truth of the statements in which they appear. In this article, I will argue that one of the usually overlooked stances, *indexicalism* about proper names, may work better in providing a uniform mechanism of reference for many classes of examples and thus may be a preferable semantic treatment of fictional uses of names.

In the following article, I will argue for two theses. The first is that, among the different existing accounts of proper name semantics, indexicalism—a stance that treats proper names as (or at least alike to) indexical expressions—is best suited to explaining various phenomena exhibited by the use of names in fictional discourse. I will discuss these phenomena and compare the solutions offered by traditional descriptivist and causal-historical theories of proper name reference with those proposed by indexicalists. Specifically, I will argue that the theories that treat fictional proper names as akin to demonstratives (rather than "pure indexicals") are best suited to explaining the mentioned phenomena. Subsequently, I will offer a novel account of indexicalism about proper names, which uses the apparatus of so-called "hybrid expressions" (Ciecierski, 2020; Künne, 1992; Predelli, 2006) as an alternative to traditional Kaplanian semantics for demonstratives. If the reader finds my first argument convincing and agrees that indexicalism is a promising approach to explaining the functioning of fictional names, I would like to offer an argument explaining why, among the variety of indexical views, one should favour such a hybrid theory over other available theories on the philosophical market (e.g., Pelczar, Rainsbury, 1998; Rami, 2014) based on the analysis of "distributed utterances" (McCullagh, 2020) and statements that employ more than one fictional context.

2. Indexicalism and Fiction

Briefly speaking, the term "indexicalism" names the family of views that state that proper names ought to be treated as a class of indexicals—contextually dependent expressions of which the reference varies across contexts (such as "I", "here", "that", etc.). A widely held justification for the construction of such theories is that treating proper names as indexicals allows the accommodation of both their directly referential character (both "pure" indexicals and demonstratives are traditionally viewed as directly referential and modally rigid expressions) and the phenomenon of "name sharing" or interconnected cases of so-called proper name ambiguity or "nambiguity" (Korta, Perry, 2011), as witnessed in sentences like the following:

(1)   John has the same name as John.

(2)   If John would quieten down, John could hear what John is saying.

(1) seems intuitively true and (2) ambiguous until we learn which of the Johns present in the room at some meeting the speaker has in mind (or points at when they speak). These claims are, however, impossible to defend if one accepts the causal-historical theory of proper name reference, which takes names to be distinctly referring devices that may be likened to logical constants. Under such a theory, on the one hand, (1) ought to be regarded as false since the first and the second token of "John" are distinct proper names referring to two different people.[1] On the other hand, (2) may be regarded as ambiguous only lexically and not semantically—the interpreter, according to causal-chain theorists, needs to know only the proper lexical form of the words used in (2) (whether the first use of "John" was of the name type uniquely referring to $John_1$)[2] to interpret the sentence appropriately. Causal-chain theorists therefore deny that the process of disambiguation of (2) in principle involves the semantic investigation of the referents of particular "John" tokens. This unintuitive consequence of causal-chain theory was regarded by many as a motivation for predicativism—the view according to which proper names are (metalinguistic) predicates of the form "the bearer of N". Predicativism may provide us with an intuitive analysis of (1)'s truth and treat (2) as ambiguous by interpreting them as predicating the same property ("the bearer of *John*") to different individuals. Predicativism is, however, widely regarded as problematic in explaining the nature of proper names as rigid designators:[3] according to the standard predicativist reading, the name N refers to its referent only in the possible worlds in which it bears the name N. Therefore, indexicalism, which explains both of these phenomena quite intuitively—since different objects may be referred to by the same indexical type ("it", "that", or "I") and simultaneously all of their tokens refer to them rigidly, is seen by some as a promising contender among theories of proper name reference.

---

[1] One of the most prominent defences against such an argument from the perspective of causal-chain theory is provided by Kaplan (1990), who argues for a distinction between "common-currency names" (uniquely referring proper names in the classical sense) and "generic names" (lexical forms of proper names, which are not used to refer to anyone). It is unclear, however, how the existence of "generic names" may account for the truth of (1), if, by definition, neither of the Johns is the referent of the generic name "John" (see Ridley, 2016 for a discussion).

[2] This is what Kaplan calls "the real ambiguity of proper names" (1989a, p. 562). Without delving further into the discussion on what constitutes "real" ambiguity, I want to note that the claim that the possibility of different interpretations of (2) stems only from our inability to interpret the lexical form of this sentence correctly (whether it is *really* a sentence of the form "if *a* would quieten down …" rather than "if *b* would quieten down …") seems implausible.

[3] For that reason, some predicativists argue that proper names are, in fact, non-rigid and try to explain away this intuition (see Bach, 2002, pp. 85–88).

Not much has been said, however, about how indexicalism about proper names may deal with the fascinating group of examples that are the uses of proper names in fictional discourse, such as "Sherlock Holmes" as used in Arthur Conan Doyle's short stories and novels or "Antonio Salieri" as used in Forman's 1984 film *Amadeus*. At least since Russell's *On Denoting* (1905), the existence of such uses has widely been regarded as evidence for a descriptivist or predicativist analysis of proper names. Since causal-chain theory requires the object to be named via some actual procedure, it seems that it is committed to the claim that all fictional uses are empty (Braun, 1993), which makes it an undesirable way of analysing fictional reference. Conversely, the descriptivist and predicativist theories make it hard to treat empty and fictional and metafictional uses of proper names uniformly—they still hold that the semantic input of a proper name to statements' content remains uniform regardless of the context of utterance.

Let us take a look at three different statements (which I label respectively *fictional*, *metafictional*, and *existential*) containing the fictional name "Sherlock Holmes":

(3)   Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street.

(4)   Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character.

(5)   Sherlock Holmes does not exist.

There are circumstances in which we would like to regard all of them as true, at least in some sense. In Arthur Conan Doyle's short stories or while discussing facts regarding them, we would certainly agree that (3) expresses truth; (4) and (5) seem like valuable information for someone who is wondering whether Doyle's stories are fiction or whether they describe the life of a real person. At the same time, though, it seems that they cannot simultaneously be true: if Sherlock Holmes does not exist, he cannot live in Baker Street; if he is a fictional character, he seems to exist at least in some sense. If (5) is true, then (3) is false, and if (4) is true, then (5) is not.[4, 5]

---

[4] This may be elaborated further to produce the "wrong kind of object" family of problems; see Klauk (2014) and Semeijn, Zalta (2021). Although these considerations fall outside the scope of this paper, I believe that the problem pointed out by Klauk is similarly dependent on the assumption that all uses of "Sherlock Holmes" in (3)–(5) need to have the same referent.

[5] An anonymous referee suggested that the following sentence might also be regarded as true: "Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character who lives at 221B Baker Street but doesn't exist". I think that the literal reading of this sentence makes it false for reasons similar to the ones indicated in the previous paragraph, unless one is determined to adopt a neo-Meinongian metaphysics of *ficta*. Although I do not subscribe to such a view, arguing against it is beyond the scope of this paper, so the reader is free to treat the content of this paper as contingent on this metaphysical premise.

This conclusion is true only if we agree that the uses of the proper name "Sherlock Holmes" present in (3)–(5) need to have the same referent. That is not the case if proper names are taken to be indexicals: although the same indexical type "Sherlock Holmes" is used in (3)–(5), their referents may very well be distinct. Treating proper names as indexicals allows us to treat (3)–(5) as context-dependent expressions and evaluate their truth with respect to the different contexts of intended interpretation: (3) in the world of Doyle's fiction but (4) and (5) in the actual world. This aligns with the general intuition that talking about fiction requires a context shift—that some statements may be *fictionally* but not *factually* true and vice versa. Let us consider another statement (an example from Predelli, 1997, p. 69):

(6)   Salieri commissioned the *Requiem*.

This sentence seems to be a perfect example of a statement that might be fictionally (in the world of Forman's *Amadeus*) but not factually (in the actual world) true—it is highly unlikely that Antonio Salieri commissioned Mozart's *Requiem*, although this alternative course of action is one of the main plot points in Forman's film and Shaffer's play about the two composers. However, is the truth of (6) dependent on the notion of truth that we apply to it (one being fictional truth) or the context in which we evaluate it? It seems intuitive that the second option is more desirable and, if so, (6) must contain some contextually dependent expression, the semantic value of which changes across worlds. The natural candidates, in this case, are the proper names "Salieri" and "*Requiem*". Note that such a strategy is in principle unavailable to causal-historical theoreticians—the proper names used in (6) are uniquely referring and cannot change their referent across worlds. We might tackle this problem by treating statements like (3) and (6) as being silently prefixed by some story operator (e.g., "in fiction *f*, …"), but such an approach still rules out the possibility of treating (4) and (5) as simultaneously true since neither in Doyle's fiction nor in the actual world (assuming that [5] is true) is Sherlock Holmes a fictional character. Predicativists also need to maintain that the utterance of (6) in fictional and actual contexts does not differ with respect to their truth conditions unless they welcome the indexicalist conclusion that being the referent of the predicate "being called *Salieri*" is contextually dependent (following, e.g., Tyler Burge [1973], who takes singular uses of proper names as complex demonstratives).[6] In the following section, I will investigate different possible indexicalist instalments of this strategy.

---

[6] As pointed out for example by Justyna Grudzińska (2007) and Ora Matushansky (2008), who regard Burge as an indexicalist. Such a view, which considers referential uses of proper names as complex demonstrative with a hidden determiner "the" or "that", is, however, not without its problems; see Jeshion's (2017).

3. Which Indexicalism?

After discussing the general prospects of indexicalism as a family of views for solving certain problems concerning the interpretation of fictional names, we should ask the following question: which type of indexicalism is best suited to solving more specific problems with the interpretation of fictional discourse? Among the variety of indexicalist views, one may broadly outline two different versions: "purism", which likens proper names to "pure indexicals" with a fixed character determining its reference in a given context, and "demonstrativism", which takes proper names to resemble demonstratives, the reference of which is determined in part by the speaker's intention or an act of demonstration. Although purism is more widely represented in the discussion on proper name semantics (e.g., by Pelczar, Rainsbury, 1998; Recanati, 1993; Tiedke, 2011), I will argue that it does not allow us to keep the given promise of indexicalism. Then, I will assert that the most popular demonstrativist approach (Rami, 2014) and its counterpart, developed to deal with fictional discourse (Voltolini, 2014), overcomes some of the obstacles of purism, although it does not easily counter the problem of sentences utilizing names from more than one fictional work.

According to purists, the referent of a proper name is determined by some contextually salient parameter independent of the speaker's intention or demonstration (e.g., contextually salient *naming conventions* [Recanati, 1993] or *dubbings-in-force* [Pelczar, Rainsbury, 1998; Tiedke, 2011]).[7] This is either explicitly or implicitly formalized in the classical Kaplan-style semantics (Kaplan, 1989a) for indexical expressions—the sentence type containing an indexical is paired with the ordered tuple consisting of relevant parameters of the context of its utterance (called simply the context set). By pairing indexical expressions present in the sentence with the appropriate parameter, we provide a semantic interpretation of a given utterance.

To see how this might work in practice, let us again compare the following two statements:

(3)   Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street.
(4)   Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character.

According to purists, they should be interpreted as:

---

[7] Tiedke applies the notion of *dubbing-in-force* (although not explicitly mentioning or subscribing to Pelczar and Rainsbury's theory) to fictional uses. According to her view, the relevant *dubbing-in-force* is picked by the context of use being referential or fictional, which in turn determines whether the name ought to be paired with an individual or some set of properties. Although Tiedke's formalism is different from the one discussed below, I take this view to be susceptible to a similar objection to purist views as well as the "co-predication" objection developed against the Rami-Voltolini account.

(3') <"Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street", $<a, t, l, @, d_f/c_f>>$

(4') <"Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character", $<a, t, l, @, d_@/c_@>>$

where a stands for an agent of context, t—time, l—location, @—the world of utterance, and d or c—the appropriate dubbing or convention salient in the context. If we take the name "Sherlock Holmes" to be an indexical, the semantic value of which is determined by the referent of the d or the c parameter, then we can regard (3) and (4) as simultaneously true provided that these two sentences are uttered in different contexts.

Is this, however, unproblematic? Although the existence of distinct actual naming conventions—for example, calling Donald Davidson and Donald Trump the name "Donald"—seems plausible, the existence of two actual naming conventions, one of which is empty while the other denotes a fictional object, does not. Remember that purists hold that the name refers to an object picked by the contextually salient convention or dubbing regardless of their intention; how then can these two different conventions, even if we grant their existence, be brought to salience? Imagine a person who is wondering whether Arthur Conan Doyle's stories are true and asks another, who has never read these stories, "does Sherlock Holmes really exist?".[8] Which dubbing or convention is salient in this situation? The lack of a clear answer here means that we also do not have any explanation for the mechanism operating behind the reference of the name "Sherlock Holmes" in (3) and (4) other than guessing.

This problem might be tackled better with another approach to indexicalism about proper names, which takes proper names to be complex demonstratives. Dolf Rami's (2014) theory, formulated in this spirit, was aimed at improving the flaws of Pelczar and Rainsbury's approach by tying the referents identified in the context with a particular occurrence of a proper name within an utterance and listing three principles of identification of the referent, which replace the dubbing-in-force or a naming convention. Rami presents his idea of establishing the reference of a contextually sensitive proper name in the following manner:

> $[[N_x]]_{c, <w, t>}$ is the object that is identified *demonstratively*, *descriptively or parasitically* in c_w in respect to the occurrence x of "N" by c_a and that is a bearer of "N" at c_t (Rami, 2014, p. 139).

---

[8] As evidenced by the number of letters written to Sherlock Holmes at 211B Baker Street (some of them actually asking for a solution to a detective mystery), this question is not merely a philosopher's fantasy. Numerous letters indicate that the detective's ontological status is an unresolved and pressing issue for many: "[o]ne man wrote that the only dispute he and his wife had ever had was over whether Sherlock Holmes had actually existed. The writer wanted the argument settled, even if it ended in divorce" (Sherlock Holmes's Mail: Not Too Mysterious, *New York Times*, 5 November 1989, p. 20).

In his characterization, it seems clear that proper names are no longer con-ceived as "pure" indexicals, as in Recanati's or Pelczar and Rainsbury's works, but as a class of complex demonstratives. According to Rami, demonstrative, descrip-tive, or parasitic identifications are ways of determining the referent by the speaker in a given context. These types of identification are mechanisms availa-ble to the speaker to single out his desired reference: demonstrative identification concerns cases of the direct presence of the named object, while descriptive and parasitic identifications are indirect forms of unique identification. The speaker may use a definite description or an intention "to use the name '*N*' in the same way as [...] a certain person or a certain group of people" (Rami, 2014, p. 127).

In this approach, the way in which the speaker determines or intends to de-termine the referent of the proper name plays an important semantic role. In-stead of assuming that the identification procedures, like the dubbing-in-force or naming convention, are somehow present or salient in the conversational context, Rami believes that they are dependent on the speaker's intention to employ them in the determination of reference. Therefore, at least at first sight, the puzzling case of someone wondering whether Sherlock Holmes actually exists is given a fairly straightforward and intuitive solution. Since the speaker employs a parasitic identification, relying on the way in which the name "Sher-lock Holmes" is used in Conan Doyle's short stories, we may interpret this question as an inquiry regarding whether the fictional character Sherlock Holmes, who is the referent of the name in the novels, is an actual person.

How could one provide a similar analysis of our puzzling sentences (3)–(5)? In his paper, Alberto Voltolini (2014) proposes a way of utilizing indexicalism in the analysis of fictional discourse. His "indexiname" account bears similari-ties to Rami's.[9] Instead of acts of identification, he introduces an *acquisition parameter*, which serves as part of an enriched narrow context:

> According to my proposal, a proper name "N.N." is an indexical whose character
> is roughly expressed by the description "the individual called 'N.N.' (in context)",
> where this description means "the individual one's interlocutor's attention is
> called to by means of 'N.N.' (in context)" [...]. Such contexts are *enriched* narrow

---

[9] Of course, these theories are not entirely convergent—Voltolini bases his interpreta-tion on his earlier indexicalist view presented in Voltolini (1995), which he himself later likens to Pelczar and Rainsbury's theory (2014, p. 299, n. 13). However, in his later paper (2014), Voltolini makes it clear that his view, while incompatible with Pelczar and Rains-bury's theory, bears many similarities to Rami's and exploits many points raised by Rami (see Voltolini, 2014, pp. 302–306, 319–320). As one of the reviewers rightfully remarked, it is problematic to classify Voltolini's account as either purist or demonstrativist since it utilizes parameters of a narrow context to determine the indexical's content. However, Voltolini holds a somewhat non-classical view on the analysis of demonstrative expres-sions: "I hold that among [indexical] expressions, proper names are closer to demonstra-tives like 'that' rather than to pure indexicals like 'I', *provided however that demonstra-tives are taken as indexicals that are to be paired with an enriched yet still narrow context of interpretation*" (2014, p. 299, my emphasis).

contexts, for they also include an "acquisition" parameter, i.e., a parameter filled by a naming practice constituted by a dubbing, which consists in calling via the name one's interlocutor's attention to something (if any), and usually also by a certain transmission chain. (Voltolini, 2014, p. 294, emphasis in the original)

To ensure that the acquisition/identification parameters are right, Voltolini ties them to a *context of interpretation* parameter. Utterances containing proper names should therefore be analysed as pairs of a sentence type and an enriched context:

$$<a, t, l, w, i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_n>,$$

where a, t, and l stand for an agent, time, and location, w represents a world of utterance (be it actual, $@$, or fictional, f)[10] or the intended interpretation of the utterance (cf. Predelli, 1997; 1998) and appropriate acts of identification/acquisition ($i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_n$) that match the context of interpretation. Adding this parameter to the narrow context likens proper names to demonstratives in Voltolini's analysis since, unlike pure indexicals, the character of proper names is only a partial function from contexts to contents (that is, proper names may have empty uses and, unlike pure indexicals, such as "I", are not guaranteed to refer to a particular person) and the way in which the additional parameter is picked might be sensitive to the speaker's referential intention (Voltolini, 2014, pp. 301–304).[11]

Following this analysis allows for the provision of a satisfying account of the same proper name being used as an empty and referring fictional name:

(5") $<$"Sherlock Holmes does not exist", $<a, t, l, @, i_1>>$
(3") $<$"Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street", $<a, t, l, f, i_{f1}, i_{f2}>>$

These two sentences are simultaneously true in their respective worlds of interpretation—$@$ and f—and acts of identification present in these worlds—i_1 and i_{f1} and i_{f2} (identifying Sherlock Holmes and 221B Baker Street in the world of Conan Doyle's fiction). Therefore, we obtain the intended result, according to

---

[10] Here I assume the existence of *worlds of fiction*—denoted by f—as qualitatively distinct from possible worlds. In the literature, proponents of this distinction point out that, unlike possible worlds (characterized by their maximality and consistency), worlds of fiction may be incomplete and, in specific cases, satisfy contradictory statements. The discussion on how one may describe these properties coherently in a more precise formal setting (usually by appealing to the notion of *impossible worlds*, cf. Berto, Jago, 2019; Priest, 2005) unfortunately is far beyond the scope of this article.

[11] Voltolini concedes that specific methods of acquisition of referential uses of a proper name are "attentional callings and their progressions" (2014, p. 304). Although this might be conceptualized as a further refinement of the procedure of putting dubbings into force, I think that it might also be minimally reconciled with Rami's notion of parasitic identification.

which sentence (3) is true and sentence (5) false when uttered by John Watson in *The Hound of the Baskervilles* or someone else who intends to discuss the contents of Conan Doyle's stories, while (5) is true and (3) false when the speaker intends to discuss Sherlock's properties in the actual world. While interpreting sentence (4) might be more problematic, these troubles might be explained away by regarding "fictional" as an indexical expression as well (in a way similar to David Lewis's treatment of the expression "actual": Lewis, 1970):

(4') <"Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character", $<a, t, l, @, i_{f1}>>$

While the indexical expression "Sherlock Holmes" is tied to the act of identification present in the fictional world, the expression "fictional" is interpreted with the actual world in mind. (4) would then be true if there is an act of identification picking out the referent of "Sherlock Holmes" in a world of fiction f accessible[12] from the actual world $@$.[13] Although, according to Voltolini, the acquisition parameter ought to be tied to the world of utterance or intended interpretation, we might stipulate that the presence of the expression "fictional" allows us to look for the act of identification in the accessible fictional worlds.

Although the potential metaphysical problem of commitment to a fictional naming convention or acts of identification still exists (namely that, in the respective fictional world, there needs to be a distinct fictional act of identification, which might be a step too far for someone who holds less robust views on the properties of fictional worlds), the success of such a theory in providing the accurate truth conditions for (3)–(5) might be seen as a "best-explanation" argument for accepting such stances. If the Rami-Voltolini account gives us a correct interpretation for different uses of fictional proper names without appealing to different reference mechanisms (as the causal-chain and descriptivist theories of proper name reference do), then it should be adopted regardless of its slightly controversial metaphysical cost.

The demonstrative or indexiname account is therefore accurately suited to providing a satisfying analysis of the functioning of proper names in fictional statements, actual statements about fictional characters, and metafictional

---

[12] As noted earlier, since fictional worlds are qualitatively different from possible worlds, the characteristics of the accessibility relation are not as straightforward as they might seem. One might stipulate that the accessibility here means simply that the existence of the respective world of fiction is known from the perspective of the relevant possible world or that the world of fiction was created by the individual in this possible world (e.g., the world of Sherlock Holmes's stories would be accessible only from possible worlds in which Arthur Conan Doyle wrote them).

[13] One might also suppose that, in such cases, we refer to *actual fictional characters* in line with Thomasson's (1999) or Zalta's (2003) characterization, if one is prepared to accept such a metaphysical stance; this seems, however, to run into problems with reconciling the truth of (4) and (5) (for further discussion, see Klauk, 2014; Semeijn, Zalta, 2021). I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.

statements. This property, as demonstrated earlier in the paper, is what drives the general promise of indexical treatment of fictional proper names, and these accounts fulfil this promise fairly effortlessly. When compared with other proposed views on proper name semantics, which are committed to the view that the name's reference is identical in all of its uses across these contexts, it proves to be significantly advantageous.

Such an account is not, however, entirely free of problems. Several authors point out that Rami's account proves to be problematic in cases in which the naming convention changes over time, and it seems not to be entirely free of pragmatic components (Ridley, 2016). Another problem might be highlighted in the analysis of more complex statements employing fictional names—one that I shall call here "the distributed context problem". Recall that, in Voltolini's analysis, the acts of identification or acquisition are tied to a certain context of interpretation and that the whole sentence needs to be analysed from the perspective of a certain world. As we have seen, metafictional statements akin to (4) prove to be challenging for such a theory—and, although a fitting refinement of Voltolini's original claim might be developed, we may take a step further in this direction and think of similar constructions that require an analysis that takes two or more fictional contexts into account simultaneously. Let us imagine that, for example, I would like not only to state something about the properties of a certain fictional character but also to compare it with another, as in the following examples:

(7)   Sherlock Holmes and Hercules Poirot are both famous detectives.

(8)   The Joker is a far scarier villain than Doctor Octopus.

Similar statements might be also produced when we take into account common discourse about the relationship between events occurring in the actual and the fictional world, as visible here:

(9)   If Arthur Conan Doyle had set his short stories in Edinburgh, Sherlock Holmes would not have lived on 221B Baker Street.

(10) The story of Salieri who commissioned Mozart to write the *Requiem* is based on the life of the composer Salieri who did no such thing.

Voltolini's and Rami's demonstrative approach has no easy way of dealing with these kinds of examples.[14] If these sentences should be evaluated with respect to only one context of interpretation, we interpret (7)–(8) either from the point of view of the actual world and actual acts of identification (and in which

---

[14] A similar problem occurs for solutions (e.g., Currie, 1986) that take sentences like (3) to have an inarticulated component in the form of a preamble: "in the fiction *f* …" or "it is a part of fiction *f* that …". For a wider and more in-depth criticism of such a view, see for example Predelli's (2008).

both acts of identification are empty) or from the point of view of only one of the fictional worlds, where only one of the acts of identification has a referent. Similarly, with (9)–(10), the context of interpretation belongs either to the actual world or to the world of fiction—for example, in the world of Sherlock Holmes stories, the proper name "Arthur Conan Doyle" lacks a referent, and, in the world of Forman's *Amadeus*, the proper name "Salieri" is tied to a different identifying procedure.

The problem evidenced here seems to lie deeper than the lack of a simple adjustment of the chosen theory to accommodate this phenomenon. What proves to be troubling here, as I will show, is the Kaplanian architecture of the formal theory used to analyse these statements, which pairs the whole sentence type with a single context (be it the context of utterance or the context of intended interpretation). In the next section, I will examine a strategy for dealing with similar problems in recently developed theories of "hybrid expressions" and try to apply a similar solution to the puzzle posed by sentences (7)–(10).

4. Hybrid Demonstrative View

The above-mentioned problem with the Kaplanian formalism is not new—Kaplan himself discusses some of the troubling cases in his *Afterthoughts* (1989b); [15] it was reinforced by David Braun's (1996) discussion of Kaplan's treatment of sentences containing more than one demonstrative expression. Such problematic cases were referred to by McCullagh (2020) as "distributed utterances", the name coming from the fact that their troubling nature consists of the distribution of utterances of the sentence across varying contexts. One may consider the following example (McCullagh, 2020, p. 114):

(11) It is cold here, but it is warm here,

where the first occurrence of "here" was used when the speaker was standing near the open window, while the second was used when they approached the stove standing at the back of the room. Notice that it is impossible to regard such utterances as true (although intuitively they might be) if we agree with the Kaplanian way of analysing contextually dependent utterances as pairs of sentence types and contexts of utterance—the indexical "here" is then interpreted rigidly by pairing it with the location parameter l of the context, which is the location either near the open window or beside a warm stove.

The puzzling nature of (11) bears certain similarities to examples (7)–(10). Similarly, the formal problem lies in the commitment to analysing the whole sentence paired with one determinate context set. Although it might not be clear for statements (7)–(8) that the within-utterance context shift occurred, it

---

[15] He discusses the statement containing five "you" demonstratives—"you, you, you and you can leave, but you stay"—and sentences containing multiple occurrences of "today" (Kaplan, 1989b, pp. 586–587).

becomes much more profound in cases (9)–(10). Let us compare (10) with a similar sentence in which the name "Salieri" is replaced by the pronoun "he":

(12) *He* commissioned the *Requiem*, while *he* did no such thing.

Imagine that the first occurrence of "he" was accompanied by the pointing gesture demonstrating F. Murray Abraham's snapshot from *Amadeus* while the second was accompanied by a presentation of the real-world Salieri's portrait. Unless some context shift occurred during the utterance, (12) ought to be regarded as false since F. Murray Abraham did not commission the *Requiem* (any more than the real-life Antonio Salieri); the first part of the sentence was uttered by utilizing the context of fictional pretence (via a deferred ostensive act), while the second used the historical context. If we believe that proper names should be treated as demonstratives and therefore take (12) to be analogous to (10), then we should regard the utterance of (10) as employing a mid-utterance context shift similar to cases of distributed utterances.

Tadeusz Ciecierski (2019; 2020) and Carlo Penco (2021)[16] note that the problems of interpreting distributed utterances in the Kaplanian Logic of Demonstratives may support another approach to the nature and formalization of indexicals.[17] This view, which I label here "the hybrid approach" (after Künne, 1992 and Ciecierski, 2019), takes the relevant parameters of context to be composite parts of uses of expressions—hence, specific uses of indexicals are regarded as composite "hybrid" objects consisting of tokens of indexicals and extra-linguistic objects that are the context parameters. From the formal point of view, instead of pairing sentence types with their contexts of utterance/interpretation, we analyse the sentence tokens containing these hybrid expressions. Let us look at an exemplary analysis of (11) in the hybrid spirit:

(11') [It is cold] [$<$)*here*($_{<l1,\ t1>}$, $l_{\text{window}}>$], [but it is warm] [$<$)*here*($_{<l2,\ t2>}$, $l_{\text{stove}}>$].

The square brackets are used to represent a syntactic regimentation of (11) (cf. Predelli, 2006) and the inverted brackets are a device for talking about the specific "here" token produced at location l and at time t (which is a way of using Reichenbach's [1947] token quotes[18] to refer to specific tokens at distinct

---

[16] A similar discussion of informative identity statements containing two demonstrative expressions "that" may be found in Textor (2015).

[17] Braun (1996) and McCullagh (2020) try to modify Kaplan's Logic of Demonstratives to accommodate these kinds of utterances. As Ciecierski (2020, n. 11) notices, these modifications are either incomplete or depart significantly from the original Kaplanian project by distinguishing the linguistic meaning and character of an expression. Although Voltolini himself does not state how his approach may deal with utterances similar to (7)–(10), he seems to accept Braun's proposal for dealing with cases of "distributed utterances" (2014, p. 302).

[18] The use of inverted quotes is borrowed from Czeżowski (1958).

times and locations; cf. Ciecierski, 2019; 2020). The whole expression, formalized as $<)here(_{<l1,\ t1>},\ l_{window}>$, is a composite object consisting of the "here" token produced in l_1 at t_1 and the extra-linguistic part, being the location of the token's utterance, which is also its referent. This regimentation of (11) allows us to accommodate the fact of the change in location parameter during the sentence's utterance and to pair the two tokens of "here" adequately with their respective referents. The indexicality is, in this view, captured by the phenomenon of introducing extra-linguistic objects or acts as parts of utterances (called, after Künne, *hybrid proper names*) instead of the change of content in differing contexts. Treating proper names as indexicals would mean, in the hybrid approach, representing their different utterances as pairs of their tokens and referents or demonstrations. On such a view, the same name type "John" might be used to refer to $John_1$ and $John_2$, and this fact is captured by representing the two referring utterances of "John" as pairs of its token and either $John_1$ or $John_2$ themselves or uniquely referring demonstrations of them. Two tokens of a single indexical expression "John" might therefore be employed as part of two different hybrid proper names; we can then distinguish a single name type "John", different hybrid name types composed of tokens of this name type and their referent, and specific tokens of this hybrid name composed of a specific token of "John" and its referent.

Since the objective of this paper is to offer a treatment of proper names as indexicals and the most promising way to do so is to approach them as demonstrative expressions, one might wonder how to formalize demonstratives in a hybrid manner that suits the purpose of regarding the proper names as such. Among the theorists of the hybrid approach, there is a disagreement on whether, in the case of demonstratives, the corresponding extra-linguistic part of an expression is a corresponding *demonstration* (e.g., Ciecierski, 2019; Künne, 2010; Penco, 2021; Textor, 2015) or simply *the intended referent* (e.g., Künne, 1992; Predelli, 2006). In the case of proper names, the latter view seems to be more appealing: most uses of proper names lack any associated pointing gesture—this could be the case only in situations in which (to borrow Rami's phrase) demonstrative identification is possible. It is even more profound in the case of fictional proper names. The concept of "demonstration" would have to be stretched highly artificially if it were to serve the purpose of saying that, when someone utters (3), they somehow demonstrate the fictional character not present in the actual world. The utterance-referent view of hybrid demonstratives' composition is therefore preferable.

Borrowing from both Rami's and Voltolini's accounts and the hybrid approach, we may formalize utterances of proper names of type N in the following manner:

$$<)N(_{<l,\,t>},\,n>$$

where $)N(_{<l,\,t>}$ represents the utterance of a proper name type N at location l at time t and n is the referent fixed by the speaker's demonstrative, descriptive, or parasitic referential intention—which is the reflection of Rami's condition on the acts of identification associated with the use of a proper name.[19]

As one may easily see, such an approach is a form of intentionalism about demonstrative reference, which yet again is a controversial matter; however, since I ruled out the possibility of supplementing the use of a fictional proper name with a demonstration, it seems fairly obvious that making use of the speaker's intention to determine its reference is the only viable alternative. A further clarification needs to be made to picture how these referential intentions work if a speaker wants to refer to a fictional object. One could, in my opinion, formulate two plausible mechanisms of reference depending on one's views regarding the metaphysics of fiction. The first and metaphysically more neutral method would be to utilize Rami's notion of the descriptive act of identification—the speaker might intend to refer to a certain fictional object as an object satisfying certain properties in the world of fiction. My success in referring to Sherlock Holmes as the protagonist of Conan Doyle's stories is then grounded in my intention to refer to the object that satisfies the description that I became acquainted with while reading Conan Doyle's stories in the world of his fiction. This explanatory mechanism is available both to possibilists, who view fictional worlds as possible worlds (in the spirit of Lewis, 1978), and creationists, who take fictional worlds to be qualitatively distinct creations of their authors (Ingarden, 1931; Thomasson, 1999). However, if one supports the latter of these stances, I believe that a more appealing way of explaining the referential mechanism here would make use of the demonstrative and parasitic referential intentions. If one takes worlds of fiction to be creations of authors, it seems that one may easily grant the existence of privileged epistemic access of fiction's authors to this world, allowing them to refer to a given object demonstratively.[20] My success in referring to Sherlock Holmes would then rest on intending to refer to whatever object Conan Doyle intended to refer to when he used the name "Sherlock Holmes" in his short stories and novels.

Now consider statements (3)–(5) again. The hybrid demonstrative picture of proper name reference in the shape presented here might approach them in the following manner:

---

[19] I develop this theory in further detail and provide more general objections to existing indexical theories of proper name reference in Tarnowski's (2022).

[20] A doubt could arise at this point as to how an abstract being (a fictional world) can be created or demonstratively referred to (and thus enter into a causal relationship with the creator's action) if it is causally isolated. The answer to a similar objection and the way of approaching the theory of abstract artifacts (based on the example of words), which I consider to be acceptable, can be found in Irmak's (2019).

(3''') [<)*Sherlock Holmes*($_{<l1,\,t1>}$, s_f>] [lives at] [<)*221B Baker Street*($_{<l2,\,t2>}$, b_f>].

(4''') [<)*Sherlock Holmes*($_{<l1,\,t1>}$, s_f>] [is a] [[<)*fictional*($_{<l2,\,t2>}$, @>] [character].

(5''') [<)*Sherlock Holmes*($_{<l1,\,t1>}$, _>]^{21} [does not exist].

The difference in how the "Sherlock Holmes" token is formalized across (3''')–(5''') of course depends on the referential intentions of the speaker. If I utter the name "Sherlock Holmes" with an intention to refer to a fictional character (as in [3]), then the token that I utter will have this fictional object as its composite part; if I intend to talk about a real-world person (as in [5]), then the token that I produce will have an empty part as its component and eventually empty reference. The hybrid demonstrative view is therefore suited to explaining and predicting correctly the truth value of (3)–(5) as well as the demonstrative approach of Rami and Voltolini. The cases that prove to be problematic for the latter theory are, however, easily resolved with the hybrid analysis:

(7)   [<)*Sherlock Holmes*($_{<l1,\,t1>}$, s_{f1}>] [and] [<)*Hercules Poirot*($_{<l2,\,t2>}$, h_{f2}>] [are both famous detectives].

(8)   [<)*The Joker*($_{<l1,\,t1>}$, j_{f1}>] [is a far scarier villain than] [<)*Doctor Octopus*($_{<l2,\,t2>}$, o_{f2}>].

The reason for this is that both characters mentioned are picked out as referents of the respective utterances independently and may be predicated with the property of being a famous detective or a scary villain without interpreting them as part of the same context of intended interpretation. Similarly, the cases in which the fictional and the actual context are mixed within one utterance are given an intuitive analysis that allows us to talk freely about the relationship between actual and fictional events:

(9)   [If] [<)*Arthur Conan Doyle*($_{<l1,\,t1>}$, a>] [set his short stories in] [[<)*Edinburgh*($_{<l2,\,t2>}$, e>], [<)*Sherlock Holmes*($_{<l3,\,t3>}$, s_f>] [would not have lived at] [<)*221B Baker Street*($_{<l4,\,t4>}$, b_f>].

(10)   [The story of] [<)*Salieri*($_{<l1,\,t1>}$, s_f>] [who commissioned] [[<)*the Requiem*($_{<l2,\,t2>}$, r_f>] [is based on the life of the composer] [<)*Salieri*($_{<l3,\,t3>}$, s>] [who did no such thing].

An interesting objection to this view might be that it remains insufficiently fine grained for some purposes.^{22} Certain proper names are used in more than

---

^{21} I follow here the convention used by David Braun (1993) to denote the empty part of a proposition being expressed by the sentence containing an empty name. By "_", I mean that the referent part of the hybrid indexical is empty.

one fictional work—say, the name "Sherlock Holmes" in the Conan Doyle sto-
ries and the 2010 BBC series *Sherlock*, set in contemporary London.[23] Let us say
that sentence (5) is uttered twice, first in a discussion of the original series of
stories and second in the discourse concerning the BBC series:

(5^{CD})   [<)*Sherlock Holmes*($_{<l1, t1>}$, _>] [does not exist].
(5^{BBC}) [<)*Sherlock Holmes*($_{<l1, t1>}$, _>] [does not exist].

It seems that one may, for example, deny (5^{CD}) and assert (5^{BBC}) if one is
convinced that the works of Conan Doyle describe actual events while the BBC
series does not—although one of those beliefs is false, it seems that one may
accept it without falling short of rationality. Nevertheless, since such a speaker
both accepts and denies the very same sentence, they seem to possess contradic-
tory beliefs, which may mean that in fact we are dealing here with two different
types of utterances.

Such a scenario clearly seems to be a variation of Kripke's (1979) puzzling
case of Peter. As such, it seems clear that the puzzle is wider in scope; however,
I think that two possible solutions may be provided. The first would be to re-
vise the proposed theory and opt for the inclusion of intentions themselves as
the corresponding non-linguistic composite part of the token of the hybrid
name. Then (5^{CD}) and (5^{BBC}) would be interpreted as:

(5^{CD}')   [<)*Sherlock Holmes*($_{<l1, t1>}$, $i_{@CD}$>] [does not exist].
(5^{BBC}') [<)*Sherlock Holmes*($_{<l1, t1>}$, $i_{@BBC}$>] [does not exist].

This would allow for distinguishing the linguistic form of the two utterances,
which, of course, comes at a cost—to secure the modal rigidity of such tokens,
one would need to commit to the view that such intentions are object dependent
in the sense proposed by Evans (1982; see also Adams, Fuller, Stecker, 1993).
This would liken this approach to the "demonstration" view of hybrid expres-
sions represented by Ciecierski, Penco, and Textor, although it would contain the
referential intention in place of an ostensive act (which, as I noted before, seems
at least to be controversial if we are to regard proper names as hybrid demonstra-
tives). I think, however, that this option needs to be treated as a last resort; in
fact, I believe that the claim that (5^{CD}) and (5^{BBC}) should be interpreted different-
ly merely because one of them may be accepted and the other rejected can itself
be rejected on principled grounds. The analogy with Kripke's Peter seems partic-

ularly elucidating here. In Kripke's example, Peter is acquainted with the name "Paderewski" via two epistemically isolated contexts—once as the name of a Polish politician and once as the name of a famous pianist and composer. Since he additionally believes that no politician can develop a taste in music, he is ready to assent to the following statement:

(13) Paderewski is a great musician,

when he believes that the token "Paderewski" in (13) refers to the politician, while he dissents to (13) if he believes that this token refers to the musician. Approaching this puzzle from a hybrid demonstrative perspective, one may follow Kaplan (1990) in noting that the perceived contradiction stems from Peter's inability to recognize that he actually uses/encounters the same name twice. If that is the case, it no longer seems puzzling that, although the name "Paderewski" is tokened in the form of $<)Paderewski(_{<l1,\,t1>},\,p>$ in both circumstances, he mistakenly believes that the form of the token differs between the dissent condition and the assent condition. Similarly, we may uphold that the cognitive difference between (5^{CD}) and (5^{BBC}) stems from not properly recognizing the form of the token present in them rather than any other condition. If one is ready to admit that the referents of our referential intentions are not always transparent to us and that such referents are parts of tokens of hybrid demonstratives, then such a conclusion should be seen as acceptable.

5. Concluding Remarks

The general conclusion of this article may be regarded as twofold—as a general methodological remark regarding the approach to proper name semantics in fictional discourse and as an endorsement of an increasingly popular way of viewing indexical expressions, called the "hybrid expressions" approach. In the first part of the article, I proposed and defended the view that indexicalism about proper names (the thesis according to which proper names should be interpreted as indexicals) is promising for the uniformity of analysis of proper name uses in fictional contexts. Its crucial feature being the ability to assign different values to a proper name across different contexts, indexicalism may provide a uniform analysis of fictional, metafictional, and existential statements about fictional characters without the need to postulate the existence of independent fictional proper names as they occur in works of fiction. From a variety of different indexical views (e.g., the popular "purist" views of Recanati [1993], and Pelczar and Rainsbury [1998]) regarding proper name reference, I singled out the demonstrative approach of Dolf Rami (2014) and a similar application of indexicalism to a fictional discourse of Alberto Voltolini (2014) as being the most promising, although not entirely unproblematic, stance regarding fictional proper names.

In the second part of the paper, I showed that the problems of Rami's and Voltolini's theories concerning the interpretation of cases of "mixed contexts"

may be thought of as a subproblem of Kaplan-style semantics for indexicals with the interpretation of so-called "distributed utterances" (McCullagh, 2020). As evidenced by the recent works by Ciecierski (2019; 2020) and Penco (2021), these problems may be solved by replacing Kaplan's paradigm of interpreting contextually dependent utterances by pairing the sentence type with a uniform context of utterance with a novel approach to indexical semantics called the "hybrid approach". Departing from this point, I pictured the alternative way of formalizing uses of fictional proper names as pairs of tokens and intended referents and demonstrated how this procedure may deal with the cases proven to be problematic for the Rami-Voltolini approach.

REFERENCES

Adams, F., Fuller, G., Stecker, R. (1993). Thoughts Without Objects. *Mind & Language*, *8*(1), 90–104.

Bach, K. (2002). Giorgione Was So-Called Because of His Name. *Philosophical Perspectives*, *16*, 73–103.

Berto, F., Jago, M. (2019). *Impossible Worlds.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Braun, D. (1993). Empty Names. *Noûs*, *27*(4), 449–469.

Braun, D. (1996). Demonstratives and Their Linguistic Meanings. *Noûs*, 30(2), 145–173.

Ciecierski, T. (2019). Hybrid Expressions. In G. Bella, P. Bouquet (Eds.), *Modeling and Using Context. International and Interdisciplinary Conference on Modeling and Using Context* (pp. 51–61). Cham: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-34974-5_5

Burge, T. (1973). Reference and Proper Names. *The Journal of Philosophy*, *70*(14), 425–439.

Ciecierski, T. (2019). Hybrid Expressions. In G. Bella, P. Bouquet (Eds.), *Modeling and Using Context* (11th International and Interdisciplinary Conference, CONTEXT 2019, Trento, Italy, November 20–22, 2019, Proceedings, pp. 51–61). Cham: Springer.

Ciecierski, T. (2020). Utterances, Sub-utterances and Token-Reflexivity. *Theoria*, *86*(4), 439–462.

Currie, G. (1986). Fictional truth. *Philosophical Studies*, *50*(2), 195–212.

Czeżowski, T. (1958). Token-Reflexive Words Versus Proper Names. In J. Pelc (Ed.), *Semiotics in Poland 1894–1969* (pp. 65–72). Dordrecht: Reidel.

Evans G. (1982), *The Varieties of Reference.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Grudzińska, J. (2007). *Semantyka nazw jednostkowych* [Semantics of Singular Terms]. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper.

Ingarden, R. (1931). *Das Literarische Kunstwerk* [The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art]. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Irmak, N. (2019). An Ontology of Words. *Erkenntnis*, *84*(5), 1139–1158.

Jeshion, R. (2017). 'The' Problem for The-Predicativism. *Philosophical Review*, *126*(2), 219–240.

Kaplan, D. (1989a). Demonstratives. In J. Almog, J. Perry, H. Wettstein (Eds.), *Themes from Kaplan* (pp. 481–564)*.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Kaplan, D. (1989b). Afterthoughts. In J. Almog, J. Perry, H. Wettstein (Eds.), *Themes from Kaplan* (pp. 565–614). New York: Oxford University Press.

Kaplan, D. (1990). Words. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volumes*, *64*(1), 93–119.

Klauk, T. (2014). Zalta on Encoding Fictional Properties. *Journal of Literary Theory*, *8*(2), 234–256.

Korta, K., Perry, J. (2011). *Critical Pragmatics. An Inquiry into Reference and Communication*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kripke, S. (1979). A Puzzle About Belief. In A. Margalit (Ed.), *Meaning and Use* (pp. 239–283). Dordrecht: Reidel.

Künne, W. (1992). Hybrid Proper Names. *Mind*, *101*(404), 721–731.

Künne, W. (2010). Sense, Reference and Hybridity: Reflections on Kripke's Recent Reading of Frege. *Dialectica*, *64*(4), 529–551.

Lewis, D. (1970). Anselm and Actuality. *Noûs*, *4*(2), 175–188.

Lewis, D. (1978). Truth in Fiction. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *15*(1), 37–46.

Matushansky, O. (2008). On the Linguistic Complexity of Proper Names. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, *31*(5), 573–627.

McCullagh, M. (2020). Distributed Utterances. In T. Ciecierski, P. Grabarczyk (Eds.), *The Architecture of Context and Context-Sensitivity* (pp. 113–124). Cham: Springer.

Pelczar, M. W., Rainsbury, J. M. (1998). The Indexical Character of Names. *Synthese*, *114*(2), 293–317.

Penco, C. (2021). Indexicals and Essential Demonstrations. *Semiotica*, *2021*(240), 261–284.

Predelli, S. (1997). Talk About Fiction. *Erkenntnis*, *46*(1), 69–77.

Predelli, S. (1998). I Am Not Here Now. *Analysis*, *58*(2), 107–115.

Predelli, S. (2006). Hybrid Indexicals and Ellipsis. *Erkenntnis*, *65*(3), 385–403.

Predelli, S. (2008). Modal Monsters and Talk About Fiction. *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, *37*(3), 277–297.

Priest, G. (2005). *Towards Non-Being: the Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Rami, D. (2014). The Use-Conditional Indexical Conception of Proper Names. *Philosophical Studies*, *168*(1), 119–150.

Recanati, F. (1993). *Direct reference: From language to thought*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Reichenbach, H. (1947). *Elements of Symbolic Logic*. New York: The Macmillan Company.

Ridley, P. (2016). *A Pragmatic View of Proper Name Reference.* (Doctoral dissertation, King's College of London, London, United Kingdom). Retrieved from:

https://philarchive.org/archive/RIDAPV

Russell, B. (1905). On Denoting. *Mind*, *14*(56), 479–493.

Semeijn, M., Zalta, E. N. (2021). Revisiting the 'Wrong Kind of Object' Problem. *Organon F*, *28*(1), 168–197.

Tarnowski, M. (2022). Proper Names as Demonstratives. *Argumenta*. doi:10.14275/2465-2334/202200.tar

Tiedke, H. (2011). Proper Names and Their Fictional Uses. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *89*(4), 707–726.

Textor, M. (2015). Frege's Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Extended. *Mind*, *124*(495), 823–847.

Thomasson, A. L. (1999). *Fiction and Metaphysics*. Cambridge: CUP.

Voltolini, A. (1995). Indexinames. In J. Hill, P. Koťátko (Eds.), *Karlovy Vary Studies in Reference and Meaning* (pp. 258–285). Prague: Filosofia Publications.

Voltolini, A. (2014). Fiction and Indexinames. *Journal of Literary Theory*, *8*(2), 293–322.

Zalta, E. N. (2003). Referring to Fictional Characters. *Dialectica*, *57*(2), 243–254.